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This submission is an edited version of the inputs contributed to the Informal
Group on the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (RGAP) for a Nuclear Weapon Free
and Non-Violent World set up in December last under the Chairmanship of Hon'ble
Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar, M.P. It grew out of the work on nuclear weapons and
national security undertaken during September-December last year, as the T.V.
Raman Pai Chair that I was privileged to occupy during that period at the gracious
invitation of Prof. V.S. Ramamurthy, Director of the National Institute of Advanced
Studies, Bangalore.
Grateful thanks are due therefore to him and other faculty colleagues in the
NIAS fraternity for their receptivity to a rank outsider and for generously sharing
their time and expertise that served to stimulate the quest for alternatives, as well
as to fellow members of the RGAP Group for dialogic discussions on ways of
advancing the vision of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of a world without nuclear
weapons. Prof. Ramamurthy's warm welcome of new ideas, and liberal mandate
for the Chair, was most conducive for the somewhat free-wheeling explorations
suited for policy oriented research.
Also to Ms. Shruthi Shivabasavaiah, Research Associate in NIAS since May,
for her valuable research assistance, as well as other NIAS researchers for their
interest and help from time to time, which together significantly alleviated the
'Input-Output ratio' of the labours !
And to the excellent team of administrative and library staff led by Shri
Srinivas Aithal and Ms. Hamsa Kalyani for their unfailing courtesy and all round
support at all stages.
Any errors of judgement -- and judgements abound aplenty in the paper, as
might be expected in a policy study -- or of a factual nature or others are, needless
to say, my own. Every effort has been made to check the veracity, and
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completeness, of the facts on which the judgements are based but, that
notwithstanding, a note of caution may be in order because this exercise had, of
necessity, to be almost entirely a library and I-net enabled one based on experience.
A word about the question of 'practicality' and 'realism' that any talk of
disarmament invariably evokes, almost on a knee-jerk basis. An opinion in this
regard has, it is submitted, to be formulated with reference to alternatives available
for attaining the same, or a demonstrably better, end state. (The aim of all politico-
military strategy is, or should be -- borrowing from US strategic theorist, Colin
Gray -- to enable enjoyment of a 'better peace', in the sense of leaving the nation
better off, in terms of peace, than in its absence. That conceptualization can provide
a sound, common sensical, litmus test for defining "better end state".) It surely
cannot be based solely on the difficulties (whether real or imagined) that are
bound to bedevil any attempt at thinking through, and beyond, the maze of paths
well trodden by. A dichotomy between the 'practical' and the 'ideal' is at times a
false one, reflecting an unwitting pre-disposition in favour of the status quo. In
this context, the resounding silence in the strategic studies literature in the country
of what should/could/might or must be done by India in order to spare itself the
unmanageable risks of a nuclear conflict or incident (which may occur not of its
own volition, or even as a result of Murphy's Law taking its toll, but of factors
fractionating from the volatile situation in its neighborhood) -- with its notorious,
unpredictable and uncontrollable, consequences on a scale, and of a magnitude,
unprecedented hitherto -- speaks volumes. That (risk quandary) is, in fact, not
addressed adequately most of the time, if at all; leaving the nation condemned,
unsaid, to live with it -- or, as might well turn out to be the case (exceptional luck
apart), perish because of it.
Saurabh Kumar IFS(retd.)
(formerly Ambassador of India to the IAEA, UNIDO &
UN Offices in Vienna; Austria; Ireland & Vietnam)
 Visiting Professor,
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SO THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE WORLD CAN COME TO BE:
PUTTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC USE
ABSTRACT
Existing initiatives and proposals for nuclear disarmament, both inter-Governmental and
unofficial ones, are appraised vis-a-vis the Indian approach, with a view to identifying possibilities
of synergy for exploration of new pathways to a Nuclear Weapon Free World (NWFW).
Their contents are examined w.r.t the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (and the subsequent
Working Paper submitted by India in 2006 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva,
the designated UN body for negotiations on disarmament issues) and other policy statements
from time to time, as the only state with nuclear weapons that is unreservedly committed to
a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Convention (as well as to agreed and irreversible
steps to prepare the ground for commencing negotiations on it).
    A hard look at the plethora of proposals in recent years shows that, some (largely
superficial) commonalities and convergences aside, only a few of them can withstand critical
scrutiny in terms of their underlying conceptualization (much less match the holistic vision,
clarity and comprehensiveness of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan and the rigor of the Indian
approach in general).  These are identified.
It is argued that the NPT, whose avowed aim is to curb proliferation of (all) nuclear
weapons of all countries (over levels prevalent at the time of its negotiation in the
mid-sixties, and not just curbing proliferation of countries possessing nuclear weapons beyond
the '1967 five', as is commonly but mistakenly taken to be the case) -- and which enjoins its
“Born in a land, I wake in a globe.” (Micheal O’Siadhail)
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members to exert themselves, inter alia, in favour of nuclear disarmament (with a five
yearly review process to introspect on the impact of their collective commitment and
cogitations) -- must also to be considered along with these proposals in any such reckoning
because it (the NPT) exerts significant influence on the nuclear disarmament discourse.
The role played by the NPT review process is analysed accordingly, taking into account
also the goings on in the IAEA, where the NPT obligation to foreswear nuclear weapons is
given operational effect. Taking stock of the situation as it stands after the 2010 Review
Conference, the  successful leveraging of the basic bargain of the NPT by the non-aligned
movement (NAM) to its advantage on this occasion is assessed positively, with an optimistic
prognosis for the 2015 Review Conference.
 Two other favourable factors -- widespread recognition of the growing disutility of,
and (hence) urgency of reaching closure on, nuclear weapons now (due, mainly, to the
spectre of nuclear terrorism sparing none), no matter what the perceived 'strategic stability'
benefits, or felt security needs, of a few individual states possessing them, and the
world-wide anxiety to bring the 'CTBT', as yet effete, to a successful denouement at the
earliest -- are noted in passing.
Taken together, these developments are indicative, it is assessed, of the significant change
in the political climate of mainstream activity on these international security issues
('non-proliferation' and disarmament) over the last few years. They have put the nuclear
weapon wallahs in the security establishments of the possessing states on the defensive as
never before, and this has opened a window of opportunity for renewed disarmament activism.
(A window that stands substantially enlarged as a result of the dramatic decline in the
economic fortunes of the USA and Europe, and the concomitant up-and-coming changes in
the global geo-economic, and geo-political, landscape.)
A bold Indian initiative leveraged on this welcome turn might therefore be timely and
opportune. There is a good chance of the NWFW aspiration being clinched at the next NPT
Review Conference in 2015, if India were to decide to work with NAM to (persuade it to)
make a determined assault on the nuclear weapons fib in these next years in preparation for
that occasion.
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The suggested approach of India taking it upon itself  to do some heavy lifting for this
purpose -- by turning its national nuclear prowess into a ‘global public good’ , by placing its
nuclear arsenal on the negotiating table (for being traded off for agreement on elimination
and outlawing of these weapons of mass destruction globally, a la the Biological & Chemical
Weapons Conventions) -- is not all that novel, or radical (or unrealistic), as it might appear
to be at first. It would simply be a return to the 'first principles' of India's 'game-changing'
strategic calculus in foreign affairs in the post-independence era (that would, of course,
call for mustering of political will, and demonstration of deft diplomacy, commensurate
with the magnitude of the task and prospective gains at hand if it is to see the light of day).
 The recommendation is premised on the reading that what is required at the present
historical juncture is not re-invention of the nuclear disarmament wheel (or its improvement
or polishing to perfection), of which there is a surfeit of sorts, so much as brainstorming on
effective ways of imparting it momentum, which is what remains woefully wanting despite a
long list of illustrious individuals having thrown their weight behind it from time to time.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is an offering in response
to the question "what can be done to
actualise the vision of the 1988 Rajiv
Gandhi Action Plan" (for a world without
nuclear weapons) that challenged the
'Informal Group on the 1988 Rajiv
Gandhi Action Plan for a Nuclear Weapon
Free and Non-Violent World' as it began
its deliberations. The possibility of
finding, or forging, synergies with the ideas
and endeavours of others active in the field
of nuclear disarmament presented itself
naturally as an obvious first choice for
exploration, along with other currents in
the mainstream of activity in the
international security arena such as the
NPT (Treaty on Non Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons) and its review process.
2. These are therefore taken up for
examination in this paper. Section II takes
a hard look at the various Governmental
and non-Governmental initiatives, and
concludes that while some do reflect
congruence in greater or lesser degree,
there are difficulties with the underlying
conceptualisation of many. And that, in
any case, more important than the 'what'
(is to be the content of the nuclear
disarmament process) question, at the
present historical juncture, is the 'how'
(to get the nuclear disarmament process
going) question. The remaining Sections
(III- VIII) accordingly focus on the NPT
review process in recent years because of
its weighty potential for effective action
in this regard. They make a positive
prognosis for the next (2015) NPT
Review Conference, and also a (somewhat
unorthodox) suggestion for India to seek
to influence its outcome (from the
outside) by putting its nuclear prowess
to politico-diplomatic use. The
concluding section (Section IX) attempts
SO THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE WORLD CAN COME TO BE:
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an outline of a possible strategy to that
end -- for catalyzing NAM's efforts for
nuclear disarmament within the NPT's
review process, with a view to clinching
the NWFW ideal now on that occasion.
II. EXISTING INITIATIVES - A SURVEY
3.  A very large number of proposals and
initiatives for nuclear disarmament have
been put forward, internationally, in
recent times (please see Annexure I for a
listing):
♦ Official, i.e. those put forward at the
inter-Governmental level, including
Resolutions tabled by countries in the UN
GA (which serve the same purpose
essentially as proposals);
♦ Quasi-official, i.e. those sponsored by
individual Governments but representing
the views of independent experts and
scholars etc. commissioned by them, or
those advanced by former political office
holders au fait with thinking in official
circles in their countries and
♦ Unofficial, i.e. those emanating from
non-Governmental bodies (advocacy
groups and think tanks).
4. Taken together, they form a veritable
treasure trove of good ideas on nuclear
disarmament related issues that can serve
as valuable source material for working
out an effective, global, plan of action for
nuclear disarmament, whenever the
international community is able to reach
agreement on the task of undertaking
such an exercise (as distinct from mere
enunciation of goals) in earnest.
[At the same time, there is a complexity
about them that deserves note at the outset.
Many of them have been put forward by
leading public figures or former military/
civil officials/political leaders with first hand
experience of nuclear weapons. As such, they
carry a lot of weight, independent of their
contents (which, it has to be said, are of
uneven quality -- particularly in terms of
the consistency, and clarity, with which they
call for nuclear weapons to be done away
with, and carry that call to its logical
conclusion, viz. complete elimination and
outlawing leading to abolition of these
WMDs, as has been achieved in case of
biological and chemical weapons, without
fear or favour).
The most well known of them all, e.g.,
is the 'Hoover Plan' put forward by the
"Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse" from
the US - Kissinger, Schultz, Nunn and Perry.
In a series of (annual almost) articles in
2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011 that began by
making the case for a change in (US)
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thinking on nuclear weapons, if proliferation
of nuclear weapons and military related
technologies were to be checked effectively,
they argued in favour of nuclear
disarmament (and even of doing away with
these WMDs altogether). However, they
ended up back-tracking from that forthright
position on the disarmament-non-
proliferation link (and pleading, essentially,
for retention of some nuclear weapons as a
hedge against uncertainty, be it in a clever
manner -- i.e. trying hard not to be seen by
their discerning audiences to be regressing
on their earlier endorsement of the vision of
a world without nuclear weapons).
There is also the related question about
the motivation underlying many of the
proposals, particularly the official and
quasi-official ones. The element of
opportunism, and cynical calculation, in a
barrage of proposals (almost all from the
establishments of the 'North') professing
nuclear disarmament making their
appearance in the run up to the 2010 NPT
Review Conference -- preventing a
breakdown in which was crucial (from their
point of view) for sustenance of the 'non-
proliferation regime' -- could not remain
hidden from most observers, at least not in
India, with its long experience of grappling
with the disingenuous arguments and
sophistry (because of its upright stand
against the NPT going back to the
negotiations in the mid-60s) that have
bedeviled the discourse in the field of
international security ever since.]
5. In addition, there is the NPT aimed,
avowedly, at curbing (all) proliferation of
nuclear weapons, which enjoins its
members to exert themselves, inter alia, in
favour of nuclear disarmament (and which
has a five yearly review process to
introspect on the impact/results achieved).
It is, strictly speaking, not in the category
of initiatives/proposals for nuclear
disarmament but has, nevertheless, to be
considered along with them (like the UN
GA Resolutions) in any such reckoning as
the present one because it too exerts
influence on the nuclear disarmament
process and discourse. And quite some
influence, in fact, as discussed later.
6. This Section attempts an appraisal of
the commonalities and contradictions
between the approach of these initiatives
and proposals and that of India, with a view
to exploring possibilities of partnership in
pursuit of the goal of a world without
nuclear weapons. (The position in regard
to the NPT is taken up separately, in detail,
thereafter, as mentioned above.)
7. The chart in Annexure IIA (borrowed
from a UN Office of Disarmament Affairs
sponsored project - http://cns.miis.edu/
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stories/100423_disarmament_proposals.
htm) gives an overview of over 40 (post-
1995) proposals, with their contents
academically arranged in tabular form in
respect of (specific aspects of) different
dimensions such as:
(i) their rationale, as e.g.
♦ danger of use (of nuclear weapons)
♦ danger of proliferation to other state/
non-state actors
♦ illegality of use/possession
♦ immorality, impracticality, military
disutility
(ii) their operative provisions for
disarmament (and collateral) measures,
as e.g.
♦ total elimination of nuclear weapons
♦ no-first use/non-use of nuclear
weapons
♦ negative security assurances
♦ prohibition of testing (CTBT etc.)
♦ curbs on modernization of arsenals
♦ verification mechanisms
♦ transparency - of arsenals, fissile
materials
♦ curbs on delivery vehicles
♦ de-targeting
(iii) their operative provisions for non-
proliferation measures, as e.g.
♦ universalisation of NPT
♦ securing against terrorist and non-
state actor access
♦ export controls
♦ dealing with non-compliance issues
(iv) the legal and political framework
within which action/advance is
envisaged, as e.g.
♦ Nuclear Weapons Convention
♦ Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
♦ Strengthened role of UN (for collective
security arrangements), Special
Sesions of the UN GA on
disarmament, strengthened IAEA
(for verification), etc.
8. A reading of the proposals (or even
of just the entries in the Chart) shows that
there is considerable variation amongst
them, in the attributes or specific aspects
they espouse, downplay or avoid touching
upon altogether -- deliberately or
otherwise. This is not surprising because
each reflects the particular circumstances
of its origins (timing, broader
international context at the time of release,
specific concerns of the sponsors and so
on) and rarely a comprehensive, text book,
exercise undertaken on a clean slate,
starting from scratch so to say, that might
possibly have resulted in greater
convergence amongst them all (professing
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
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broadly the same objective - of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation).
9 Thus not all are categorical on the
issue of (total) abolition of nuclear
weapons -- clearly the most important,
and crucial, aspect from the Indian point
of view -- ,  with many paying no more
than lip-service to that objective and some
even remaining silent (in operative terms),
stopping at 'non-proliferation' steps only.
This has been taken as a touchstone for
sifting the grain from the chaff, as it were
-- those not categorical on the issue of
doing away with nuclear weapons
altogether were not taken up for detailed
examination, since they are an obvious
'no go' for India (because of their
perpetuating, implicitly if not explicitly,
a privileged category of nuclear 'haves' in
some form or another). The list in
Annexure II B gives the remaining eighteen
proposals/initiatives that are forthright on
the issue of total abolition of nuclear
weapons (in addition to the UNGA
Resolutions, that reflect the overall trend
of opinion in the international community,
and a few others, important for other
reasons -- as e.g. the stature of the
individuals sponsoring them).
[Included in these eighteen is the 2010
NPT Review Conference Final Document but
this being sui generis, is left aside for the
moment, as it is taken up for detailed
examination in the succeeding Sections.]
10. These selected proposals have been
analysed in the framework of the Indian
standpoint (spelt out in Annexure III, on
the basis of the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action
Plan, the subsequent Working Paper
submitted by India in 2006 at the CD
and other policy statements from time to
time) and tabulated in the chart in
Annexure IV A (to give a comparative
bird's eye view of where they stand vis-a-
vis the Indian approach). Annexure IV B
presents the (same) results of the analysis
in a different format more suited for
scrutiny of individual proposals, rather
than an overview. And, finally, annotated
extracts of notable aspects of each of them
are given below, with a view to presenting
a (more qualitative and overall) picture
of their strengths and weaknesses from
the point of view of the present exercise:
(i) Official level proposals:
(a) UN Secretary General's Five Point
Proposal (October 2008):
Carefully crafted to avoid ruffling any
(member state's) feathers, as appropriate
for anyone in his (the UN SG's) position,
the sub-text of this "five-point proposal"
clearly points in the right direction (of
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11
abolition of nuclear weapons) even
though it does not mention that as a goal,
explicitly:
Recommends pursuit of nuclear
disarmament by the NPT parties through
"agreement on a framework of separate,
mutually reinforcing instruments.. or
…..negotiating a nuclear weapons
convention."
Also commencement of P-5
discussion "on security issues in the
nuclear disarmament process" within
the Military Staff Committee of the UN
SC (a novel idea, as these have not been
held hitherto) and convening of a
Summit on nuclear disarmament by the
UN SC.
Other suggestions include "freeze (on)
their own nuclear weapon capabilities"
and making of "their own disarmament
commitments" by "non-NPT states";
"new efforts to bring the CTBT into force";
greater transparency on nuclear arsenals
etc, "global taboo ….on the very
possession of (WMD)" - nuclear weapons
included herein, presumably, but not
mentioned explicitly.
[French President Sarkozy's response
to the UN SG on behalf of the EU (Dec.
2008):
Smugly papers over the main issue of
nuclear disarmament, apart from a clever
play on words, by implicitly linking it to
"general disarmament" and by invoking "an
overall political and strategic perspective"
as the guide for action (which is essentially
one of 'non-proliferation' -- the need "to
move towards a safer world at ….. (the then
yet to be) May 2010 NPT Review
Conference", "universal ratification of the
CTBT", fissile materials treaty, "measures
of confidence and transparency" etc. The
only mention of "elimination" (of anything)
is in the context of tactical nuclear weapons
and short and intermediate range missiles,
that too eventually at the end of an
(unspecified, indefinite) process, not
immediately.
The sole concession made to cater to
the UN SG's call for nuclear disarmament is
"…beyond that, mobilisation in all the other
areas of disarmament" - that comes at the
end of a list of what are termed as "concrete
and realistic initiatives" (as e.g. those listed
above).]
(b) Ten Nation Initiative Berlin
Statement (2011):
Concern over proliferation is the main
spur. Predicated on the NPT as the
"essential foundation for the achievement
of nuclear disarmament". Makes "concrete
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
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proposals for action on key elements of
the (2010 NPT Review Conference)
Action Plan", in effect overwriting the
delicately balanced consensus of that
document.
No operative provisions for advancing
towards a 'world without nuclear weapons'
- that is paid only lip service, backtracking
from their categorical position of 2010; in
fact, the 2011 statement makes no demands
of the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)
whatsoever, beyond reporting of their
arsenals.
(c) Seven Nation Initiative (Norway etc.)
2005:
Concern over proliferation and
nuclear terrorism is the main spur again.
(Issued after the failure of the 2005 NPT
Review Conference and the 2005 World
Summit). Seeks universalisation of the
NPT and early 'entry into force' of the
'CTBT'. Weak on operationalisation of
the 'world without nuclear weapons' ideal
and makes no demands of the NWS
whatsoever.
(d) New Agenda Coalition (1998):
Categorical on the need for total
elimination of all nuclear weapons of all
states, with a clear cut "road map towards
a nuclear-weapon-free world". Forthright
in calling upon "the Governments of each
of the nuclear weapons states and the
three nuclear-weapons-capable states to
commit themselves unequivocally" to
that end and "agree to start work
immediately on the practical steps and
negotiations required for its achievement".
Unexceptionable to that extent.
Makes a pointed call, however, on "the
three nuclear-weapons-capable states" to
"reverse the pursuit of their respective
nuclear weapons"….. "in order for nuclear
disarmament to proceed " (emphasis
added). Also to "adhere to the NPT, and
accede to the CTBT without delay or
conditions".
(e) Model Nuclear Weapons Convention
(NWC) -1997, revised in 2007 by the
International Campaign to Abolish
Nuclear Weapons and re-circulated in the
UN by Costa Rica and Malaysia:
Unexceptionable in its approach,
with comprehensive prohibitions covering
all aspects of nuclear weapons related
activities so as to ensure their total
abolition, as might be expected of a draft
Convention of its kind.
However, it carries over the definition
of "Nuclear Weapons States" as per the
SO THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE WORLD CAN COME TO BE
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NPT (and of countries like India, Pakistan
and Israel (and DPRK) as "nuclear
capable states") -- with separate
provisions applicable to, or pertaining to,
"Nuclear Weapons States" in respect of
not only destruction obligations (which
would be understandable) but also in its
provisions for membership of the
Executive Council set up under the
Convention and Entry-into-Force. Makes
a 'status' distinction, thereby, between the
NPT NWS and later nuclear weapon
states. Unexceptionable, but for this
aspect.
The International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons has done a
detailed study of the positions of all
members of the UN (both of their
Governments, based on their vote in the
UNGA on the relevant resolution (on
follow up to the 1996 Advisory Opinion
of the International Court of Justice) and
on their official statements in the CD and
other important gatherings, as well as of
their publics, based on some public
opinion surveys in each country) on the
NWC idea (http://www.icanw.org/files/
NWC-positions-December2010.pdf),
rating them on a four star scale. 54 are
rated as four star, i.e. "Very supportive,
88 "Supportive", 21 "Lukewarm" and 29
as "Sceptical". China is in the 3 star
category (qualified support), while all the
other four NWS are opposed to it, despite
overwhelming support amongst each of
their publics. (This last aspect deserves
note, for the possible leads it could
provide for the contemplated Indian
initiative.)
(f) 2000 NPT Review Conference Final
Document -- 13 Practical Steps:
Oft cited (for the unequivocal
undertaking by the NWS in it to
accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals, as well as for other
related, important, affirmations) but
overtaken by the (strengthened) consensus
of the 2010 Review Conference (examined
in detail in the succeeding sections).
(g) NAM Action Plan of April 2010
(submitted to the 2010 NPT Review
Conference):
Takes clear cut positions on all
nuclear disarmament related issues (that
have obviously been finely chalked out
in the course of intense (intra-NAM)
negotiations during several NAM
Summits over the years). Time tested
formulations therefore, beginning with the
overall chapeau that: "the total
elimination of nuclear weapons is the only
guarantee against the use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons".
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Lists a whole series of specific steps
to that end. Careful to put in a caveat
about sequencing (and prioritisation) of
individual steps, declaring them all as
"inextricably inked", obviously in the full
knowledge that it (sequencing of
individual steps) can make all the
difference from the point of view of equity.
Call for early entry into force of the
'CTBT', starting with ratification by the
"nuclear weapon States" (not NPT NWS,
which is not a category it uses).
Calls for "an international conference
at 'the earliest possible date' to achieve
agreement on a phased programme for
the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons within a…..specified time-
frame, including …a treaty to eliminate
nuclear weapons (Nuclear Weapons
Convention)"
Several effective collateral measures
to reduce dangers in the interim until
elimination/abolition takes place.
Makes no distinction between
"nuclear weapons states", as e.g. NPT
NWS or others.
Unexceptionable, and clearly the
proposal of choice for India.
(h) UN GA Resolutions:
In addition to these, there are five UN
General Assembly Resolutions on nuclear
disarmament (listed in Annexure II B
under Official Proposals) that are tabled,
and adopted, every year by overwhelming
majorities. Leaving aside the one on a
Convention for prohibition of use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons (Res. 65/80),
which is (tabled by India but not pertinent
here, being) a limited purpose one - to
reduce the risk of outbreak of a nuclear
conflict -, the remaining four are all on
nuclear disarmament.
Of these four, the one (co)sponsored
by India (Res. 65/76 on "Follow-up to
the advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the Legality of the
Threat or use of nuclear Weapons")
provides for an operative paragraph
calling upon all states to commence
"multilateral negotiations leading to early
conclusion of a nuclear weapons
convention". It brings in most of the other
elements of the Indian approach in its pre-
ambular paragraphs, apart from this
reference to a NWC in one of its operative
paras covering core aspects (because the
NWC, by its very definition, can be
expected to address all aspects in an
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integrated manner - hence the importance
attached to it by all serious activists).
Except for China, all the other NWS vote
against it, as already noted above, with a
total of 133 nations in favour, 28 against
and 23 abstentions.
The other three are, however, not free
of lacunae and India is therefore
constrained to vote against, or abstain
on, them. This is primarily because of the
calls for, or references to, universalisation
of the NPT they include, which obviously
cannot be acceptable to India. Or for early
entry into force of the 'CTBT', which too
is a coercive demand on India and
therefore also unacceptable (as explained
in paragraph 47). That is the case even
with Resolution (Res 65/56) sponsored
by many NAM countries, which is
otherwise on the lines of the NAM Plan
of Action and so largely in keeping with
the Indian policy approach. India
therefore abstains on it (as also Pakistan
and Russia), while USA, UK and France
vote against it. China votes in favour. (The
Russian abstention is, in all likelihood,
because the Resolution calls for a 'no-
first-use' undertaking.)
Of the other two, one (Res. 65/73)
titled "United Action Towards the Total
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" is a
disingenuous one, in which the professed
objectives (as per the title) are subsumed,
in the operative provisions of the
Resolution, in larger non-proliferation
provisions, which is where the main thrust
of the Resolution is (with the nuclear
disarmament paras addressed to the NWS
being weakly worded -- without any time-
bound element, rendering the exhortations
to them to discharge their nuclear
disarmament obligations almost
meaningless). It is, not surprisingly,
supported by all four NWS apart from
China (which abstains, possibly because
one of its operative paragraphs demands
transparency, as a pre-requisite for advance
on nuclear disarmament -- something that
the Chinese are perhaps not ready for).
Despite its call for universalisation of the
NPT, India does not oppose (vote against)
it but abstains. (Pakistan and Israel also
abstain and the DPRK is the only country
to vote against it.)
The other (Res. 65/59), an Arab
sponsored resolution, again calls for
universalisation of the NPT (whose
operative thrust is purportedly against
Israel, but which goes on to name India
too, along with it and Pakistan, in that
context). India is therefore constrained to
vote against it (joined by USA, France and
the DPRK, apart from Israel). The UK
abstains, while China and Russia support
the Resolution.
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These aspects notwithstanding, there
are obviously several elements in all these
resolutions that can form the basis of a
concerted common approach, if the
shadow-boxing on the main issue of
categorical commitment by all nations to
give up all their nuclear weapons in a
specified time-frame (which is what
queers the pitch, essentially, at present for
any kind of joint action internationally)
were to be sorted out. But that will
obviously require a fundamental shift in
the basic positions and policies of the
NWS, away from reliance on nuclear
weapons for their security, so it will not
be soon, we can be sure.
The problem in using UN GA
resolutions as a basis for assessing
positions of countries and possible
pathways to nuclear disarmament is that
there is a large element of posturizing and
playing to the gallery (and to the publics
of politico-military alliances), out of
political considerations, in the voting
record of most countries. Their voting
pattern is therefore not a reliable guide to
their stance in actual disarmament
negotiations, much less so of their red lines
(that emerge at later  stages when the
chips are down, but a prior guess about
which is one of the determinants of drafts,
negotiating stances and opening gambits
for those planning initiatives and
proposals in this tricky field). Minus that
micro-aspect (regarding individual
country positions), however, they are a
good indicator of the overall trend of
international opinion, and in that respect,
the Indian position has no reason to be
disappointed (barring the NPT and
'CTBT' related bumps, which are, of
course, very real issues that have to be
tackled with care).
(ii) Quasi-official proposals:
(a) Blix Commission (2006):
Comprehensive approach, focusing on
practical measures for reducing nuclear
dangers in its 60 recommendations.
References to non-proliferation (NPT)
and disarmament obligations are
balanced; does not seek to foist the NPT
on non-parties.
However, its key weakness lies in
the absence of any operative provision
for elimination or prohibition of nuclear
weapons, beyond asking all states
possessing them to "address the issue
of their continued possession of such
weapons", "commence planning for
security without nuclear weapons" and
prepare "for the outlawing of nuclear
weapons", which it  professes to
advocate.
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Also it calls on India and Pakistan
by name, nevertheless, to ratify the
'CTBT' and join "those other(s)" who
are implementing a moratorium on
production of fissile material for weapons
purposes, without demanding the same
of China  (except as part of the five
NWS).
(b) Canberra Commission (1996):
Very good content, as in the Blix
Commission, but better -- does better by
not fighting shy of calling for elimination
and total abolition of nuclear weapons in
unambiguous terms in its operative parts.
Comprehensive and unexceptionable
approach that is still not dated, really,
despite being of 1996 vintage.
(c) Tokyo Forum (1998):
Formed in the wake of the Indian and
Pakistani tests of 1998. Addresses the
basic nuclear weapons related issues well,
pragmatically but without losing sight
also of the complete elimination
desideratum amidst its primary concern
about (horizontal) 'proliferation' dangers
and that of an "unraveling of the NPT
regime".
Forthright (and refreshing) in its
approach, reflected inter alia in its
recommendation that the NWS "reaffirm
the goal of elimination and take
…concrete steps towards this end" and
call upon each of them to do their bit in
parallel, without waiting for each other
(and India and Pakistan not to make "the
phased reduction and elimination…….
even harder by building up their nuclear
capabilities").
Quite original in recommending that
the CD "revise its procedures….and carry
out purposeful work, or suspend its
operations", arguing that, inter alia, the
consensus rule should be given up.
Forthright in addressing the exclusion
of the issue of sub-critical tests - that is
rarely done - while urging all (US, Russia,
China, India, Pakistan and others by
name) to accede to the ‘CTBT’ in order
to bring it into force. Likewise, in respect
of the issue of missile defences.
Recommendations include one to
"stop and reverse proliferation in South
Asia", which is elaborated upon to make
several demands on India and Pakistan,
including urging them "to renounce
nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT
as non-NWS".
(d) Mayors for Peace: Hiroshima-
Nagasaki Protocol (2008):
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Though conceptually a Protocol to be
attached to the NPT, yet it has an
extremely good perspective predicated
explicitly on the basic bargain of the NPT
Article VI (going to the extent of
"considering that......... the discriminatory
nature of the Treaty, wherein NWS parties
are exempted from the prohibition on
acquisition of nuclear weapons, is
incompatible with pursuit in good faith
of nuclear disarmament...." and "that full
equality before international law must be
established by elimination of all nuclear
arsenals......." ).
Concise and pointed in its operative
provisions for complete elimination of all
nuclear weapons. Unique in mentioning
obligations of the NWS first (to "cease
forthwith" all activities prohibited for
non-NWS, along with related measures
such as "safe and secure storage" of
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable
material, incorporation of nuclear
weapons into nuclear doctrines) and only
then those of "other states parties to this
Protocol possessing weapons usable fissile
material......" to do likewise.
More forthright and categorical in its
operative provisions than most other
proposals - "safe and secure storage" of
all nuclear weapons and fissile material
no later than 2015, followed by
negotiations for elimination of all weapons
and delivery, launch and command and
control systems aimed at a NWC no later
than 2020.
(e) Juppé, Norlain, Richard, Rocard:
Pour un désarmement nucléaire global
(2009):
Prompted by fear of proliferation, in
the absence of nuclear disarmament, and
thrust is accordingly on limited,
instrumental use of the latter in the service
of the former - weak in its operative
provision for abolition of nuclear weapons
(no time bound element).
Makes bold to ask France not to shy
away from assuming commitments.
(f) Claes, Dehaene, Michel, Verhofstadt:
Towards a nuclear weapon-free world
(2010):
Categorical on the basic question of
abolition, even though proliferation of
nuclear weapons was the main spur: (Like
Obama), "we also want to make a plea
for a world without nuclear weapons…
No fundamental argument exists why this
option is not feasible within a foreseeable
timeframe. This problem…. demands a
new commitment of all nuclear weapon
states ….. to achieve 'global zero'"
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"The nuclear weapon states must
respect international agreements calling
for the elimination of their arsenals, which
they have not done to date despite the
obligation to disarm contained in the
NPT, signed by all formal nuclear weapon
states."……
...."Beyond this (reductions in
warheads, CTBT, FMCT, No-First Use,
Prohibition of use etc), there is a need to
begin multilateral negotiations for a Nuclear
Weapons Convention. This treaty has to
prohibit nuclear weapons, just as chemical
and biological weapons are prohibited, and
this within a fixed time-frame."
Despite this very good perspective, it
focuses rather narrowly on tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe in its operative
provisions, possibly because of its being
a newspaper article written for Belgian
and European audiences.
(g) Nordli, Brundtland, Willoch et al A
Nuclear Weapon-Free World (2009):
A forthright piece with a very good
overall perspective, which, while lauding
the "Four Horsemen's path-breaking
revival of the idea of a Nuclear Weapon
free World (NWFW), emphasizes that "we
have to be serious both about the vision
(of a NWFW) and about the (concrete)
measures (to be taken to that end)…..The
goal must be a world where not only the
weapons, but also the facilities that
produce them are eliminated…….."
"………The United States and
Russia, which together account for more
than 90 per cent of the world's arsenals,
must take the first steps. They should
reduce their arsenals to a level where the
other nuclear weapon states may join in
negotiations of global limitations…….
All types of nuclear weapons - also the
tactical ones - must be included in the
negotiations. We urge Russia, which has
big arsenals of tactical weapons, to accept
this…….Establishment of missile shields
should be avoided, for they stimulate
rearmament."
Written on the eve of the 2010 NPT
Review Conference, it was a one-off piece
of the authors for throwing their weight
behind the then burgeoning initiatives.
Unexceptionable in its approach but no
sustained espousal or advocacy.
(iii) Unofficial proposals:
(a) Article VI Forum, 2011 (Middle
Powers Initiative):
Forthright and earnest in seeking
establishment of a world without nuclear
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weapons - early "enactment of a universal,
verifiable, irreversible and enforceable
legal ban on nuclear weapons".
Advocates a "comprehensive rather
than a piecemeal" approach with
involvement of all, not just states
possessing nuclear weapons, and
implementation of the UN SG's proposal
through UNGA adoption of a "resolution
establishing a preparatory process for
negotiation of a convention or framework
of instruments for the global elimination
of nuclear weapons". (Draft Resolution
for consideration of the UNGA
prepared.)
Stresses the legal incompatibility of
nuclear weapons with (existing)
international humanitarian law as an
imperative for achievement of a nuclear
weapon free world.
All in all, unexceptionable in content.
(Not clear, however, which 'middle
powers', if any, support it, as claimed by
its website.)
(b) Global Zero (2009):
Forthright in calling for complete
elimination, with emphasis on
multilateral negotiations, recognising
realistically that " the only way to
eliminate  the nuclear threat (of
proliferation and risks of nuclear
terrorism) is to achieve the phased,
verified, multilateral elimination of all
nuclear weapons - global zero". Offers a
"practical, end to end strategy" for that
purpose in a "four phased process for......a
legally binding international agreement
for eliminating all nuclear weapons".
Avoids use of the NPT term "Nuclear
Weapon States", sticking to "nuclear
weapon countries" or "nuclear capable
countries" (suggesting treatment of all
states with nuclear weapons or capability
on par - including on the question of
"putting the entire fuel cycle of all
countries under international safeguards"
- unlike most other proposals).
Claimed, and considered, by many to
be the foremost nuclear disarmament
movement for its rapid growth since 2008
and success in innovative communication
and reaching out to large sections of
public opinion globally.
Good overall perspective.
However, the operational provision
for negotiation of a global zero accord
(legally binding international agreement)
is placed in Phase 3 (2019-23), not
upfront (even just to specify that as the
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objective of the exercise), while those for
"other nuclear weapons countries" (i.e.
other than US & Russia) -- as e.g. to freeze
their arsenals and "commit to reductions
proportionate to those made by the US
and Russia or for all nuclear capable
countries to ...sign/ratify CTBT" -- come
upfront in Phase 1. This results in
iniquitous apportioning of burden
sharing.
(c) Roadmap to Abolition 2009 (Nuclear
Age Peace Foundation):
A good, simple, four phased roadmap
to abolition of all nuclear weapons, as
suggested by its name; the very first two
elements of which (in Phase 1) are "US
commitment to a world free of nuclear
weapons" and "US and Russia begin
bilateral negotiations on … elimination
of their nuclear arsenals", followed soon
after by initiation of "negotiations for a
Nuclear Weapons Convention".
Subsequent sequencing of operational
provisions is also more balanced (and less
iniquitous) than other proposals.
Uses the NPT categorisation
"Nuclear Weapon States" but only in a
descriptive, and not normative, sense - its
apportioning of  responsibilities and
obligations of all "nuclear weapons states"
at various stages is (realistically) fair.
The elements "Complete the required
ratifications of the CTBT so that it enters
into force" and "Achieve universal
adherence to IAEA comprehensive
safeguards", however, come in Phase 2,
before "Global conference .... to
sign Nuclear Weapons Convention" in
Phase 3, resulting in a degree of inequity.
(d) Getting to Zero (2011):
Aims at "build(ing) belief in the vision
of a world free of nuclear weapons and
advocacy of the steps required to move in
that direction". Forthright in declaring,
while supporting the US-Russia reductions
of their strategic weapons by a third, that
"a reduction of a third is a good first step;
however, we need to abolish nuclear
weapons completely".
Not much information available,
however, on specifics of their approach.
(e) The Abolition 2000  (Global Network
to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons):
Founded in 1995, after the NPT
Review (and extension) Conference did
not bring up the question of abolition of
nuclear weapons on its agenda. Hence
forthright in calling upon "the nuclear
weapons states, declared and de facto, to
take …. steps to achieve nuclear weapons
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abolition" and urging "parties to the NPT
to demand binding commitments by the
declared nuclear weapons states to
implement" a series of specific measures
as e.g. "Initiate immediately and conclude
negotiations on a nuclear weapons
abolition convention that requires the
phased elimination of all nuclear weapons
within a time-bound framework". (Brings
in the idea that "when fully implemented,
the convention would replace the NPT".)
Does not hesitate to recognize that "this
goal cannot be achieved in a non-
proliferation regime that authorizes the
possession of nuclear weapons by a small
group of states. Our common security
requires the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons. Our objective is definite
and unconditional abolition of nuclear
weapons."
Also against nuclear energy, as such
(i.e. for civilian purposes as well),
however.
(f) Pugwash (2007-12):
Possibly the oldest, and most
prestigious of all the advocacy groups in
terms of its membership and pioneering
initial work in fostering dialogue across
the ideological divide during the Cold
War, the functioning of this group of
Nobel laureates and intellectuals seems
to have fallen prey to routinisation and
co-option by states. Also to omnibus
inclusion of causes and concerns within
its purview (perhaps to placate all
members), and consequent loss of thrust
in its activities.
Thus while the Eleventh (2007-2012)
Quinquennium goals begin by listing the
nuclear danger in clear terms ("Pugwash
is strongly committed to the goal of
abolishing all nuclear weapons. It is
imperative that Pugwash constantly
remind the international community of
….and … propose concrete steps towards
their elimination"), the rest of the
Document is long on description and
analysis and short on prescription as to
what needs to be done.
Action areas listed range from deeper
cuts in nuclear arsenals, de-alerting
and effective dismantlement of retired
warheads to conventional weapons, small
arms and land mines and include also
economic deprivation, environmental
deterioration, and resource scarcity and
unequal access to resources, causes and
motivations for terrorism etc.
The organisation's decision making
also appears to be in difficulty - the
document put out on a January 2010
meeting in Milan on the eve of the
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2010 NPT RC covers various nuclear
disarmament issues quite well but is
described on its website to be the "sole
responsibility" of two of its office bearers
(and a Professor from the local host
organisation), indicating failure to reach
consensus on its contents within the
organization as a whole.
(g) El Baradei's Five Steps towards
Abolishing Nuclear Weapons (2009):
This forthright and cogently argued
2009 piece by the then Director General
of the IAEA (and eminent lawyer), Dr. El
Baradei, stands out for the categorical
statement it makes on the disarmament-
non-proliferation linkage: "the only way
to prevent nuclear weapons from
spreading and ultimately being used is
to abolish them".
Likewise, on double standards:
"…if leading world powers believe
their security depends on having weapons
that could annihilate our entire
planet…..how can we credibly expect
other nations….. to refrain from seeking
the same weapons?........ States with
nuclear weapons…in particular, the five
NWS party to the (NPT) …. must show
that they are serious about their 40 year
old legal commitment to scrap all nuclear
weapons….the division between nuclear
weapon "haves" and "have-nots" is not
sustainable in the long term"  (emphasis
added)
11. As would be noted from the above,
the NAM Plan of Action is clearly the one
that India could go along with all the way,
unreservedly, as it is fully congruent with
the long standing, and well considered,
Indian approach both conceptually as well
as in its operational provisions.
[This, of course, is not accidental, for
the positions underlying the NAM Plan of
Action are carefully negotiated ones, at
successive NAM Summits and other
important gatherings, with full Indian
participation (and consent). It is only in the
NPT forums, and therefore in relation to this
Plan of Action submitted by NAM NPT
parties to the 2010 RC, that an Indian input
(and influence) is absent, so unless any of
the NAM positions (on disarmament issues)
are altered there - an unlikely eventuality -,
there would be no reason for this NAM
document to be not congruent with the Indian
approach.]
12. Apart from the NAM Plan, the
approaches of the Mayors for Peace
Hiroshima - Nagasaki Protocol, Model
Nuclear Weapons Convention, Canberra
Commission, Article VI Forum (Middle
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Powers Initiative), Roadmap for
Abolition, Global Zero, Abolition 2000,
Tokyo Forum and International
Campaign for Abolition of Nuclear
Weapons also stand out and could be the
proposals of choice, after ironing out of
some aspects, for coalition building for
taking things forward. The organizational
strength of the groups and/or think-tanks
sponsoring them (and suitability for joint
action based on their overall political
orientation and influence within the
domestic polities of their respective
countries) would, of course, need to be
evaluated separately. (Some of those put
forward by leading public figures and
former leaders too would qualify, in
addition, but they are more in the nature
of one-off, opinion building, pieces and
not complete proposals as such, so
perhaps not much amenable to coalition
building.)
13. Overall, there is a lot in these
proposals and initiatives for disarmament
activists in India, as elsewhere, to laud
and welcome -- especially in the unofficial
proposals, a number of which have been
prepared by leading professionals with
great commitment to the NWFW ideal
and are therefore not disingenuous. They
are rich in content, in that they take on
the various arguments advanced by the
powerful security establishments of the
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) in favour
of retention of nuclear weapons head on,
and demolish them forcefully. Also, over
the years (since presentation of the Rajiv
Gandhi Action Plan at the third Special
Session of the UN General Assembly on
Disarmament in 1988), scholarly and
expert understanding of the inter-
connectedness of issues, and of their
sequencing, has grown significantly,
resulting in more complete and
comprehensive proposals having been put
forward. Any serious global exercise of
drawing up a road map, or Plan of Action,
for reviving and activating the nuclear
disarmament process would immensely
benefit from these works, all labours of
love.
14. Unfortunately, the same cannot be
said about some of the other proposals,
official and quasi-official ones
particularly. They suffer from (serious)
lacunae or shortcomings in their
conceptualisation --  from the Indian
point of view, that (rightly) seeks
embedding of all (professedly nuclear
disarmament) steps in an overall context
hinged on the complete and time-bound
elimination, leading to abolition, of all
nuclear weapons of all nations in a non-
discriminatory manner. The faulty
conceptualization stems from their
(unstated, i.e. implicit) acquiescence in the
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(inherently hegemonistic) positions of the
NWS, reflected in their anxiety to steer
clear of the red lines of the latter in the
name of 'realism'. That leads them to leave
the question of abolition, or even
prohibition of use, of nuclear weapons, out
of their purview.
[Helpless in getting the NWS to accept
restraints and responsibilities not to their
liking, they go about concentrating their
fire, and passion and proclivity for profiling
and publicity, on the others instead (viz. the
'potential' nuclear weapon states). The
quintessential 'non-proliferation' approach,
in other words, which remains satisfied with
'arms control' (reductions in the arsenals of
the two leading NWS from one absurdly high
level to another somewhat less absurd level,
as "deep cuts" that the rest of the world ought
to applaud), while busily devising better and
better ways of closing 'proliferation risks'
-- as e.g. through the 'CTBT' now (after
failing to throw their weight behind  the
nuclear test ban idea  effectively during the
Cold War, when it might have impeded the
arms build up of the superpower they were
in alliance with) and international control
of the fuel cycle, now that more and more
countries from the developing world want
to go in for nuclear power. (These measures
would be unexceptionable, needless to say,
if appropriately contextualized in an
equitable overall framework.)]
15. This is not to argue for India
distancing itself from such initiatives,
much less for shunning them as unworthy
of engagement because of their
weaknesses or faulty conceptualisation.
Even if there is a single positive aspect in
a proposal -- and quite clearly there is far
more than that in almost every one of
them --, elementary united front tactics
would dictate that it needs to be looked
upon as a potential ally by any nation
serious about making a difference to the
nuclear disarmament scenario. The
positives would need to be encouraged
and built upon, while trying to work
around, or at least blunt the edges of,
those aspects  that do not, in the Indian
view, serve the process well through a
strategy of uninhibited engagement with
all actors active in the field, no matter
what their plank or motives.
16. As might be expected, these
proposals (have) exert(ed) varying degrees
of influence on the (international)
decision-making process, depending upon
the political push (and clout) of their
sponsors, timing (historical juncture) etc.
In general, none can be said to have proven
to be the 'spark that set the prairie on
fire'. This is obviously not due to lack of
meritorious content, it could safely be
surmised, but to want of political will and
inclination on the part of Governments,
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especially those of the NWS and their
powerful allies, to consider the contents
of such proposals seriously, even after the
end of the Cold War, unless it suited them.
(Individual elements of various initiatives
proposed from time to time have, of course,
been picked up by the powers that be on
occasion -- so, in that sense, they can be
said to have served as repositories of ideas
now and then.)
17. That was the fate of the Rajiv Gandhi
Action Plan too -- not to receive any
serious attention at all, internationally,
despite its conceptual clarity (and
comprehensive scope) and, at the same
time, pragmatic phased approach
cognizant of ground realities (that did not
fight shy of imposing, i.e. accepting,
obligations on the threshold states like
India as well upfront). In retrospect,
and with the benefit of hindsight, it can
be seen that what was lacking in it was
not content but calculation: realpolitik
levers capable of kick-starting, and
driving, a nuclear disarmament process
on their own steam or, in fact, even of
compelling consideration in any official
multilateral forum.
[This is where the NPT review process
comes in, promising (as argued in the
following sections) far more efficacious
possibilities of galvanising the nuclear
disarmament dialectic than any proposal or
initiative on the anvil -- official, quasi-
official or unofficial, singly or in
combination.]
18. In sum, therefore, there may be no need
for the international community to invest
energies in addressing afresh the 'what'
question (what needs to be done to get rid
of the nuclear menace). There is enough
material, analysed ad nauseum almost from
every conceivable angle, for decision-makers
to draw upon whenever they are ready to
get off the mark. It is the 'how' question --
how to get nations, the basic units of
international life (the NWS, really) to bite
the bullet as it were and (collectively) take
the steps necessary for 'actualising' the
vision of a 'nuclear weapon free world' so
elegantly spelt out on many an occasion in
many a document -- that requires
pondering over in a brainstorming, out of
the box thinking, mode.
19. For it is here that the 'community' of
nations has been stuck for over half a
century now, unable to act on the call of
the very first Resolution of the UN GA
(of 1946) to do away with nuclear
weapons adopted unanimously (and
amply endorsed in spirit subsequently,
over the years, in some form or another)--
because of one or the other of the 'Big
Powers' (changing their minds and) not
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finding it to be in their interest to allow
concrete moves in that (agreed) direction.
[The hopeful signs of advance were
many, almost to the decade:
♦ in the early 60s, thick in the midst of
the Cold War (but early on after sinking in
of the paradigm shifting impact of  the
advent of the nuclear weapon on war and
politico-military strategies), when the USA
and the former Soviet Union managed to
reach agreement on the famous Zorin-
McCloy Principles in 1961 that included
(most notably, for skeptics of the nuclear
disarmament ideal in the now hardened
security establishments of some NWS)
not only "elimination of all stockpiles of
nuclear ….and other WMD and cessation of
their production" and "elimination
of all means of delivery of WMD" but
also " a programme…(to) ensure that
(….disarmament is general and complete
and) war is no longer an instrument for
settling international problems";
♦ then again in the second half of the 70s,
in the bloom of 'détente', when the Final
Document of the first Special Session of the
UN GA on Disarmament in 1978 adopted
by consensus re-iterated the same message
(of the need for elimination of nuclear
weapons on priority);
♦ yet again in the mid-80s, when the
'Geneva spirit' of the fire-side chats
between the two great (nuclear) iconoclasts,
Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev, had all
but fructified at Reykjavik in 1986 (but for
the impasse over Reagan's 'Star Wars'
fantasy unrealized till today, almost three
decades down) - narrowly missing the
opportunity to take the promise of the 1985
Geneva Summit that a nuclear war “cannot
be won and must not be fought” to its
logical conclusion and declare that  it
“would  not be fought”;
♦ post-Cold War at the historic UN
Millenium Declaration of 2000, in which
Heads of States and Governments resolved
“to strive for elimination of WMD,
particularly nuclear weapons and to keep
all options open for achieving this aim", and
finally
♦ in September 2009, when the UN
Security Council met at Summit level, under
the Chairmanship of US President Obama
on the theme of "Nuclear Non-proliferation
and Nuclear Disarmament", and adopted
Resolution 1887 aimed at creating "the
conditions for a world without nuclear
weapons" but stopped short of including a
single nuclear disarmament step in its 29
operative paragraphs (which were all on
‘non-proliferation’ measures).
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Today it is hardly believable that it was
the USA, under President Kennedy, that had
given the clarion call in the UNGA in 1963
that "the (nuclear) weapons of war must be
abolished before they abolish us."]
20. Put differently, one might say that the
need today is not so much to re-invent
the disarmament wheel (or to polish it to
perfection), of which there is a surfeit of
sorts, as to brainstorm on finding effective
ways of imparting it momentum, which
is what remains woefully wanting despite
a long list of illustrious individuals having
thrown their weight behind it from time
to time.
III.THE NPT
21. In addition to these proposals and
initiatives for nuclear disarmament, there
is the NPT aimed, avowedly (as noted
at the outset), at curbing (all)
proliferation of nuclear weapons (over
levels prevalent at the time of its
negotiation in the mid-sixties) -- the only
treaty of its kind, professing to curb
growth of nuclear arsenals, even though
not a universal one -- which enjoins its
members to exert themselves, inter alia,
in favour of nuclear disarmament (and
which has a five yearly review process to
introspect on the impact/results of their
collective commitment and cogitations).
It is, strictly speaking, not in the
category of initiatives/proposals for
nuclear disarmament as such but has,
nevertheless, to be considered along with
them in any such reckoning as the
present one because it too exerts
influence on the nuclear disarmament
process and discourse. And quite some
influence, in fact, especially in recent
years.
22. The NPT was premised on an
'envisioned end of all nuclear weapons'
-- even if not in as many words -- to quote
from the belated acknowledgement of this
fact by the 'Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse' from the US (Kissinger,
Schulz, Perry and Nunn) themselves in
their by now famous, path-breaking,
2007 article cited in para 4above.
[The basic bargain of the NPT is that
(the vast majority of) states without nuclear
weapons (on 1.1.1967) foreswore not to go
in for them, in acknowledgment of
the danger of proliferation of these weapons
globally, in return for a solemn undertaking
by the states that possessed nuclear weapons
on that date to reduce, and eventually do
away with, theirs. That bargain was
encapsulated in Article VI of the NPT, in the
form of an obligation (of all parties, those
in the latter category -- the Nuclear Weapon
States (NWS) recognised in the Treaty -- in
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particular obviously) to "pursue negotiations
in good faith on effective measures relating
to ……. nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty
on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control".]
And Article VIII.3 of the Treaty
provides for a review every five years "with
a view to assuring that the purpose of the
Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty
are being realized". This has been done
duly -- in the form of Review Conferences
(RC) of the NPT parties every five years
since its entry into force in 1970 taking
stock of developments, even if more in
form than in substance.
23. The long-winded wording of Article
VI has, of course, been utilized by the
NWS to the hilt (as was evidently the
purpose of that carefully drafted
language) over the years to wriggle out
of the spirit of their obligation (to do
away with their nuclear weapons, in
order to pave the way for their abolition)
by doing just about enough to be able
to claim compliance with its letter (with
the focus being kept on the act of
"negotiating in good faith", rather than
on producing meaningful outcomes in
those negotiations). Such subterfuge has,
however, been a subterranean exercise --
not a brazenly cynical one and, at least
for form's sake, the provisions of Article
VI hold sway as the ultimate
commitment (by the NWS) in the field
of nuclear disarmament, for whatever it
is worth.
24. This farcical exercise
notwithstanding, it is the five yearly
review process of the NPT (out of all of
the myriad proposals, initiatives and
ideas floating around in the field of
international security studies)
that provides the main vehicle
for advancing towards the goal of nuclear
disarmament -- for the vast majority
of nations in the world, it has to be
recognized; India's differences
with (and dislike of) the NPT
notwithstanding. This is because it is the
largest inter-Governmental forum where
the nuclear disarmament question -- that
of elimination of nuclear weapons
included -- is (supposed to be) on the
table, at least implicitly. And on the
basis of a legally binding obligation
undertaken by the NWS, it must be
remembered (as the eminent lawyer, and
former Director General of the IAEA,
Dr. El Baradei, amongst others, has
reminded everyone) -- not just as a
desideratum advocated by some eminent
or ambitious individuals strutting the
world stage. As such, it is by far the
most weighty of all in terms of its
influence and impact, inadequate though
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that impact may have proven to be in
absolute terms for clinching concrete
action on nuclear disarmament so
far. (This is notwithstanding the fact
that the NPT review process takes
place outside the official forums of
the UN -- the CD, UN DC, UN GA,
UN SC etc. -- and (politically speaking)
in a comparatively light-weight, no
more than a passing and peripheral,
manner.)
25. The NPT and its review process
have therefore to be taken seriously and
reckoned with, it is submitted, for there
simply is no other equally representative
(or authoritative) game in town.
26. Not being a party to it, India has
(rightly) stressed the non-universality
of the NPT (and the consequent
untenability of the repeated calls for its
universalisation, re-iterated at the 2010
Review Conference). The country has
(understandably) kept out of all
deliberations conducted within the
framework, or associated with, the NPT
regime and, accordingly, not taken
cognizance of its review process either (in
general, and of its discourse on nuclear
disarmament related aspects in
particular) -- neither previously nor (last)
time after the 2010 RC.
27. However, it is not in India's interest
to (continue to) close its eyes to the
developments within the NPT review
process. The advances made therein may
be creeping and miniscule and may be
embedded, moreover, in a fundamentally
flawed framework but they constitute the
reference point against which nuclear
disarmament issues (which have been a
central concern of India's strategic security
policy) are addressed by an overwhelming
majority of nations in the world. India can
therefore ill afford to (continue to) treat the
NPT review process as a 'touch me not'.
28. Particularly so now, after the last
(2010) RC made significant advance, as
argued in the next two Sections below.
IV. THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
PROCESS: RECENT BACKGROUND
29. The NPT's review process acquired
a significant political profile over the last
few RCs, ever since the landmark 1995
RC, when the question of its future was
on the anvil (and which extended it in
perpetuity, much to the relief of the USA
and other NWS and the industrialised
countries in general).
[Even before that, the discovery of Iraq's
attempts at clandestine acquisition of weapons
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capability in the early 90s, which exposed the
infirmities in the NPT, gave it (and its
safeguards arrangements in the IAEA, with
all their legalistic technicalities) an
unprecedented salience. It led to moves (in
the IAEA) to tighten the NPT's safeguards
arrangement with the IAEA (which is the legal
mechanism for giving operational effect to
the pledge of the non-NWS to foreswear
nuclear weapons). These moves were resented
by the developing countries, who were alert
to the wrong (policing) direction, away from
the promotional role of "accelerating the
peaceful use of nuclear energy" stipulated in
the IAEA's Statute as its Objective, in which
these moves were likely to take the IAEA.
This tussle resulted in a negative feedback
into the NPT's review process (wherein the
right of the non-NWS to peaceful uses of
nuclear energy was an important discussion
point, as one of the three pillars of the NPT --
the other two being nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation), turning it into an active
political battleground between the
industrialised and developing countries
amongst its parties over basic issues of rights
and obligations of non-NWS versus those of
the NWS.
Although they were unable to resist
adoption (and recommendation) of a "model
Additional Protocol (AP)" by the IAEA's
Board of Governors in 1997 to empower the
IAEA to check for "undeclared" nuclear
activities and materials in the non-NWS
party to the NPT, inter alia, through
"challenge inspections", the developing
countries were extremely resentful of this
attempt to impose additional obligations on
them, as non-NWS, while leaving the NWS
untouched as far as their obligation(s) were
concerned (because the model AP was not
applicable to them).
{The NWS were left free to, and did go
on to, conclude their own "Additional
Protocols" drafted (by themselves) to stay
within their self-defined red lines - a purely
cosmetic exercise undertaken in the cynical
calculation that so long as an Additional
Protocol had been concluded by them with
the IAEA, a semblance of balance in the
additional obligations being sought to be
foisted on the non-NWS could be claimed
(counting on ignorance of the correct factual
position, regarding the crucial difference in
the nature of the two APs, on the part of large
sections of the media and other non-specialist
audiences) !}
Not surprisingly, many developing
country non-NWS have refrained from
signing the model Additional Protocol to this
day.
 The model Additional Protocol (widely,
but wrongly, alluded to in the media and even
in professional level literature as the
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Additional Protocol, as if there was just one
in existence) was to prove particularly
controversial later, in the aftermath of the
hyped justification advanced for the Iraq war
and in the wake of the Iranian compliance
conundrum (with Iran resiling from it after
having signed and Egypt and others openly
refusing to sign it unless Israel accepted it,
along with full scope safeguards).
All this could not but have a bearing
on the NPT review process as well.]
30. The(se) contentious debates in the
IAEA came about at a time when the NPT
was approaching the deadline  of its 25th
anniversary in 1995 (which carried with
it a major question mark about the future
of the Treaty -- because of uncertainty over
the period of its validity, under its Article
X.2, after expiry of 25 years since its entry
into force in 1970). It had the consequence
of further raising the NPT's profile (and,
with it, the potential for realpolitik, as
below).
31. The USA and other protagonists of
the NPT were able to secure its indefinite
extension at the 1995 RC, as they had
been anxious to, but not without paying
a political price (in the form of agreement
on "principles and objectives of non-
proliferation and disarmament") that
included :
♦ a decision (Decision 1) to "strengthen
the review process… …with a view to
assuring that the purposes… and the
provisions of the Treaty are being
realised";
♦ a decision (Decision 2) reiterating the
"ultimate goal(s) of the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons ….. " (in
the Preambular part of the decision) and
a programme of action in the substantive
part that was said to be important for
"the full realization and effective
implementation of article VI" and which
included "the determined pursuit by the
NWS of systematic and progressive efforts
to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with
the ultimate goals of eliminating those
weapons….." and
♦ a Resolution on a Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East,
inter alia, calling upon all countries of the
region to accede to the NPT, and accept
full scope IAEA safeguards on (all) their
nuclear facilities.
NAM, the largest grouping within the non-
NWS, tasted blood, so to say, with its
successful extraction of US acquiescence in
its long standing demand (at the behest of
its Arab members) for a Middle East NWFZ,
despite a singling out of Israel in all but
name (and without its consent, as it was
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obviously not present on that occasion). The
negotiating lesson (of the leverage that was
inherent in the review process, but had been
allowed to lie dormant and unexploited
hitherto) could not have been lost upon
NAM in the course of all the wheeling and
dealing at this landmark RC.
32. Thus began a process which was to
gather momentum in the succeeding RCs.
The next RC in 2000 adopted the oft-
cited 13 "Practical steps for the
systematic and progressive efforts to
implement Article VI" (generally
abbreviated as 13 Steps for Nuclear
Disarmament in literature). They were
spear-headed by the 'New Agenda
Coalition' countries and included, most
notably, an "unequivocal undertaking by
the NWS to accomplish the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals".
33. The 2000 RC set the tone for the
strengthened review process called for at
the 1995 RC, by implicitly focusing on
the basic bargain of the NPT between the
NWS and the non-NWS -- of the hard
promise of 'non-proliferation', on the part
of the non-NWS, versus the loose
prospect of nuclear disarmament, through
action on the part of the NWS. Not
surprisingly, the proposition that "nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation are
mutually reinforcing", hardly heard
hitherto, found mention in the 2000 RC
Document (even if tucked away in an
obscure section on South Asia under
Article VII). This was a first; subsequently
this refrain began to figure more and more
prominently in the discourse, in implicit
acknowledgement of the idea as one
whose time may have come.
34. The Bush Administration's scant
regard for arms control and multilateralism
in general (and consequent repudiation
of the "13 Practical Steps" at the failed
2005 RC, which was unable to reach any
agreement at all) did result in a regression
but the setback was temporary and
partial. The trend (of the 'realpolitik'
potential of the non-proliferation-
disarmament link gaining increasing
acknowledgement in the public discourse)
continued to grow stronger, what with the
DPRK 'break-out scenario' and the risk
of Iran following suit emerging to the
fore during this period. Also increasing
recognition, at the same time, of the
vulnerability of nuclear fissile materials
world-wide to theft and of the attendant
risk of acts of nuclear terrorism.
35. By the time the US was ready to
change over to the Obama Administration
in end 2008, a spate of proposals
cognizant of the near impossibility of any
strengthening of the non-proliferation
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regime without prior, or at least parallel,
progress on the nuclear disarmament front
were circulating amongst the strategic
establishments of the US and those of
other Western countries. Obama's Prague
speech of April 2009 affirming "America's
commitment to..... the security of a world
without nuclear weapons" brought a
certain gravity to these early straws in
the wind, as also the September 2009
Summit of the UN Security Council on
"Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear
Disarmament" convened by the USA and
chaired by Obama himself (even though
its operational parts dwelt, almost entirely,
on 'non-proliferation' measures after
beginning in the Preamble with a
profession "to create the conditions for a
world without nuclear weapons"). It was
these ideas, scattered and amorphous
as they were, that did the rounds in the
open forum discussions and debates in
the run up to the May 2010 RC (in
addition to concerns about Iran's non-
compliance and about the DPRK
imbroglio), which thus took place
against the above background of both
heightened expectations, as well as
wide-spread nervousness about the
possibil ity of the NPT regime
unraveling in the event of a repeat of
the 2005 RC's failure to agree on
anything (that seemed possible, indeed
likely, at that time).
V. THE 2010 REVIEW CONFERENCE
36. The outcome of the 2010 RC was
somewhere in between those two extremes
-- though it was unable to agree on the
Final Document (FD), as a whole,  it was
able to adopt the "Conclusions and
Recommendations for Follow-on Actions"
part of the FD by consensus. (That left
the "Review of the Operation of the Treaty"
part of the FD outside the consensus --
and it therefore figures in the FD as the
Conference President's understanding of
what had transpired.)
37. The consensus part of the document
(Conclusions and Recommendations for
Follow-on Actions) consists of four
Sections -- one each on the so-called three
pillars of the NPT (nuclear disarmament,
non-proliferation and peaceful uses of
nuclear energy) and one on "The Middle
East, particularly implementation of the
1995 Resolution". The first of these
sections contains, most notably, an "action
plan on nuclear disarmament, which
includes concrete steps for the total
elimination of nuclear weapons" and a
reaffirmation of "the unequivocal
undertaking of the NWS to accomplish
the total elimination of their nuclear
arsenals ….. to which all States parties
are committed under Article VI".
(emphasis added.)
SO THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE WORLD CAN COME TO BE
35
38. 64 action points, 22 of them on
nuclear disarmament related aspects, are
listed in the consensus document. Some
of them are worth a read:
a) Action 1: Commitment to "the
objective of achieving a world without
nuclear weapons".
b) Action 3: Commitment (by the NWS)
to "undertake further efforts to reduce
and ultimately eliminate all types of
nuclear weapons", "in implementing the
unequivocal undertaking (by the NWS)
to accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals".
c) Action 5: Commitment by the NWS
to "accelerate concrete progress on
………nuclear disarmament…", together
with a call on them to "promptly engage"
to that end, with seven specific aspects
spelt out:
♦ overall reduction;
♦ all types of nuclear weapons to be
covered;
♦ diminution of role in security
concepts, doctrines and policies;
♦ prevention of use;
♦ legitimate interest of non-NWS in
further reductions in operational
status of nuclear weapons;
♦ reduction of risks of accidental use
and
♦ transparency.
The NWS are further "called upon
to report the above undertakings to the
2014 NPT Prepcom" and the 2015 NPT
RC is to "take stock and consider the
next steps of the full implementation of
Article VI".
(It is left to the NWS to decide how to
"engage with" these measures in the
interim and "report" on them by the time
of the 2014 deadline.)
d) Action 6: The Conference on
Disarmament (CD) to "immediately
establish a subsidiary body to deal with
nuclear disarmament", within the context
of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced
programme of work".
e) Action 20: All States parties to
"submit regular reports, within the
framework of a strengthened  review
process….., on the implementation of the
present action plan, as well as of  article
VI……..".
f) Action 21: NWS "encouraged to
agree as soon as possible on a standard
reporting form …… for ...voluntarily
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providing...information…".  UN SG
"invited to establish a publicly accessible
repository, which shall include the
information provided by the NWS".
g) Para B (iii) of the Section on Nuclear
Disarmament: Recognition accorded, for
the first time in an NPT context, to the
need for a Nuclear Weapons Convention:
"the Conference notes the proposals for
nuclear disarmament of the SG of the UN
to, inter alia, consider negotiations on a
Nuclear Weapons Convention or
agreement on a framework of separate
mutually reinforcing instruments….".
h) Para B (iv) of the Section on Nuclear
Disarmament" Recognition of the
"legitimate interests of the non-NWS in
the constraining by the NWS of
……qualitative improvement of nuclear
weapons and ending the development of
advanced new types of nuclear weapons".
i) Para A (v) of the Section on Nuclear
Disarmament: Implicit acknowledgement
of debate on the legality of use of nuclear
weapons, which could be used as a tool
for their (further) delegitimisation :
"…...deep concern at the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences of any use of
nuclear weapons and …..need for all
States ….to comply with……
international humanitarian law".
39. It is notable, moreover, that the
initial draft Report of Main Committee
I on nuclear disarmament (which was
released half-way down the Conference on
May 14) had called for "the need to
implement Article VI within a time bound
framework". It had further called upon
the nuclear weapon states to "convene
consultations not later than 2011 to
accelerate concrete progress on nuclear
disarmament…." In addition, it
contained a provision inviting the UN
Secretary General "to convene an
international conference in 2014 to
consider ways and means to agree on a
road map for the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons within a specified time
frame, including by means of a universal,
legal instrument". (emphases added.)
40. Such categorical formulations could
not, of course, be agreed upon (for
adoption by the RC in its FD) because of
resistance from the NWS -- France and
Russia mainly, and to a lesser extent USA
& China. (UK reportedly stayed out of the
discussions largely, reportedly for want of
instructions from the newly formed
Government.) On the idea of time-lines
and legal frameworks (which, according
to one analyst, accounted for a good bit
of the time and heat in the debate), the
Final Document simply affirmed that "the
final phase of the nuclear disarmament
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process should be pursued within an
agreed legal framework, which a majority
of States parties believe should include
specified time lines". (emphasis added.)
41. Yet, even though the above-
mentioned core aspects were diluted
drastically, what is notable for the
purpose of the present exercise (of
exploring possibilities of advancing the
vision of the 1988 RGAP of a world
without nuclear weapons) is the very fact
that they were brought up so -- in full
cognition, we can be sure, of the high
political value of the basic NPT bargain
(for everyone, but for the NWS in
particular) and, concomitantly, of the
immense negotiating leverage it afforded
as a result. And that is something that is
unlikely to go away.
42. It is another matter that this leverage
could not be put to effective use. The
reason for this can be attributed to NAM
(and New Agenda Coalition) Chair
Egypt's opportunism in settling for
diluted formulations behind the backs of
other members (evident from the lauding
of Egypt's "helpful role in bringing NAM
countries around" in commentaries by
pro-NPT analysts in their post-RC
writings) in order to secure a deal with
the Americans on the Middle East NWFZ
in (separate) bilateral negotiations with
them. (The latter was, by all accounts, a
key dynamic at the 2010 RC because of
Egypt's deep attachment, widely assessed
to stem from reasons to do with domestic
politics under the Mubarak regime, to the
Middle East NWFZ idea as a way of
countering Israel's nuclear capability).
But that can, and will, change -- apart
from the new dispensation in Egypt now,
because Iran is due to take over
Chairmanship of NAM from Egypt in
2012 and can be expected to play the
nuclear disarmament 'card' to the hilt at
the next RC in 2015.
[N.B. This is a fortuitous, if
challenging, circumstance from India's point
of view. Iran could be encouraged, and
assisted, to do so in a constructive way --
without overplaying its hand, as it is reported
to have done at the 2010 RC, for the 2015
RC would be too good a disarmament
opportunity to be missed in polemics or
partisan ends.]
43. It is also notable, in this context, that
the formulations on nuclear disarmament
were not the only ones to be left weak in
the finally agreed text of the FD. Those in
the Sections on non-proliferation and
peaceful uses of nuclear energy (where
much 'tightening' of loose ends was
sought by the US and other countries of
the North) are even weaker in comparison
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to what was desired and pushed for. NAM
countries (primarily, but non-NWS from
the South in general) were able to block
moves for strengthening of the non-
proliferation 'tool box' (as it has been
termed by one empathetic European
analyst) -- declaration of IAEA's model
Additional Protocol as a (mandatory)
standard for safeguards verification in
particular -- in retaliation for the absence
of any comparable weighty commitment
in respect of nuclear disarmament.
Likewise in respect of attempts to beef
up the costs of withdrawal from the NPT
(to prevent recurrence of DPRK like errant
behaviour) and 'multilateralise'
the fuel cycle (to restrict spread of
proliferation sensitive enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to the nuclear
new comers from the developing world).
And the most contentious non-
proliferation issue -- Iran's alleged non-
compliance with its NPT obligations --
could not even be pressed for at the RC;
the Western countries had to rest content
with dealing with it outside the RC -- in
the UN SC just about the same time - for
fear of failure to have their way. (Of course,
Iran too, for its own reasons, appears to
have preferred that this be so.)
44. NAM's readiness to play hard ball --
a clear prequisite for any significant
advance on the nuclear disarmament
front in the future RCs -- need not
therefore be in doubt anymore; how far it
can go in pressing its weight is, of course,
another matter that will depend, apart
from the incumbent Chair, on many
factors, including above all the overall
international situation at the time of the
next RC.
[That gives India a chance of making
a weighty contribution, as discussed in the
following sections, if it would be prepared
to review its approach of remaining aloof
from, and indifferent to, the NPT review
process and step in as a 'player' ready to
make strategic interventions from the
outside. Especially so as the incoming NAM
Chair - Iran, from 2012-15 - can be expected
to take full advantage of the nuclear
disarmament Achilles' heel of the NWS and
play it to the hilt, as a 'card', in its present
stand-off with the US and other Western
powers' attempts to curb its relentless
acquisition of proliferation sensitive
technologies and materials (aimed at
advancing itself into the category of the
'nuclear capable', capable of exercising
'recessed deterrence' of sorts without
necessarily crossing the nuclear Rubicon).
The knots inherent in the latter situation add
to the possibilities of India positioning itself
as a key interlocutor -- tactically as well --
if it would be ready, and find it worth its
while, to play the game.]
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45. In the light of the above, the half-
way house compromise outcome of the
2010 RC should be assessed positively
on the whole by those (disarmament
activists world-wide) serious about
effecting change but bereft of levers for
bringing it about. And not just because
"ideas once regarded as a pipe dream
were now considered appropriate topics
for mainstream debate" (as one account
of the 2010 RC has put it) but also
because of the degree of realpolitik that
could be brought into play on this
occasion on the strength of the 'non-
proliferation-disarmament divide'. And
of the ripening, and ripened, public
opinion in favour of nuclear
disarmament world-wide (no matter that
this was not done to the full extent
possible, allowing the NWS to get away
yet again with a charade).
46. Overall, there is reason to hope,
therefore, that the next RC could turn
out to be a decisive one for the non-NWS
seeking to hold the NWS to account on
their Article VI obligations and secure
from them an unequivocal commitment
to finally deliver now on the goal of
outlawing and elimination of nuclear
weapons, a la the prohibition of other
categories of WMD in the Biological and
Chemical Weapons Conventions already
concluded.
VI. THE NPT AND INDIA: BASIC
CONTRADICTION
47. Where does India come in, in this
account of the potential of the NPT's
review process, with its record of
opposition to that Treaty, as already noted
in paragraph 26 ? The NPT process is
obviously not free of problem(s) for India
-- it could not be otherwise, given the
fundamental contradiction between it and
the Indian approach. This is reflected,
above all, in the recurrent, almost
evangelical, calls by the NPT parties for
universalisation of the NPT: the 2010 RC
asked States not parties to the Treaty to
"accede (to it) as non-NWS ...... promptly
and without any conditions" (emphasis
added), without considering it necessary
to predicate that call on agreement on a
nuclear weapon free world (NWFW) in
any way.
[And in its partial, stand-alone,
measures led approach -- its ready advocacy
of the 'CTBT', international control
('multilateralisation') of the nuclear fuel
cycle etc. as immediate priorities, without
weaving them together into (or linking them
in any way with) the overall objective of a
NWFW. That would result in a diversion, as
is well known, away from nuclear
disarmament, towards 'non-proliferation'.
Such an approach results, a la the classic
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case of the NPT, in iniquitous apportioning
of burdens between nations -- a feature that
has constrained India to invariably stay away
from stand-alone measures that are not
embedded in a process of nuclear
disarmament with a clear cut overall end
result of prohibition of nuclear weapons
specified therein.
The same is true, in some degree or
another, of most of the other initiatives and
proposals for nuclear disarmament that have
been proposed from time to time, including
many that are categorical about abolition
of nuclear weapons. They (almost) all
advocate immediate entry-into-force of the
'CTBT' -- as it stands -- and that is obviously
problematic for India, which had striven
hard to have an operational link with
nuclear disarmament incorporated in the text
of the Treaty in the crucial final stages of
the negotiations in the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva in 1996 (and had
to reject it when that proved to be impossible
and India was named, on the other hand,
without its consent and despite its objections,
in the list of countries whose accession would
be required for it to enter into force).]
48. These contradictions are, of course,
not new. They reflect the skewed
understanding and approach of the
majority of nations to the nuclear
weapons conundrum that India has long
experience of battling with in defence of
its national sovereignty and dignity. It can
therefore perhaps continue to do so  in
the face of these (2010 RC and others')
calls for universalisation of the NPT and
early entry into force of the 'CTBT' etc.
as well -- by maintaining the 'opt-out'
and 'live-and-let-live' approach taken
hitherto, i.e. essentially by ignoring them,
while staying out of these Treaties. That
would be one way of dealing with these
contradictions -- an easy way since it
would not entail anything other than
'more of the same' by way of a policy
response.
49. That would, however, be a defensive
approach, it is submitted, with a sub-
optimal outcome as it would be missing
out on an excellent opportunity to
advance the nuclear disarmament cause.
50. The challenge is to find a way of
boosting, and tapping, the positive energy
of the NPT's review process (and that of
the 'CTBT' train and all other initiatives
professing nuclear disarmament) without
getting trapped in a defensive posture vis-
à-vis their negativities. Of pro-actively
leveraging on the NPT parties'
aspirations and strivings for nuclear
disarmament, while side-stepping the
contradictions. A 'finesse' operation by
India, in other words, making use of their
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self-perception (in the words of one NPT
insider) that 'it -- the NPT -- was central
to all other attempts to bring about
realization of a NWFW', to actualise that
goal (of elimination of all nuclear weapons
everywhere), without allowing the
differences (over the differential
obligations of the NWS and the non-
NWS in the interregnum until the
'nuclear nirvana' state of a NWFW kicks
in) to come in the way.
VII. OVERCOMING THE CONTRA-
DICTION: POLITICO-DIPLOMATIC USE
OF INDIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
51. Fortunately, this is feasible,
impossible though it might appear at first
to be.
52. The 'contradiction' between the NPT
approach and the Indian vision of a
nuclear weapon free world (NWFW) is
over the means, and not the end(s). It can
be gotten over, therefore (and turned on
its head as it were), if India were to by-
pass the differences (over the means) and
go for the end directly, constraining them
(the NPT parties) to do likewise.
53. For that, the nation would need to be
prepared to trade off its nuclear arsenal
for the larger, long term, strategic interest
of securing a world without nuclear
weapons. Thus, India could shift gears in
responding to the 2010 NPT RC's (and
others') call for universalisation of the
NPT by going beyond the set 'neti' refrain
(or hankering after acknowledgement of
'NWS' status, as some in the country
have been prone to do) and declaring
readiness to give up its nuclear weapons
if all NWS (and others) were to make a
legally binding commitment to do so,
while re-iterating its inability to meet any
expectations of its joining the NPT
(whether as a non-NWS or as a NWS).
In other words, a more active approach
to the NPT's contradiction (within itself,
between its professed objective and its
operative provisions, which is also the
contradiction with India) than the
passivity underlying its policy so far.
54. Such a bold announcement/initiative
is bound to have great impact at the next
NPT RC in 2015, strengthening as it
would the hands of NAM and other non-
NWS for clinching the basic NPT bargain
on that occasion by extracting a
categorical (and legally binding)
commitment from the NWS to match the
Indian offer in some specified time-frame.
The call for universalisation of the NPT
would then have been finessed,
catapulting its energy in reverse (in a judo
like move, as it were) in the service of the
grand goal of a NWFW.
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[The NPT parties would not be able to
reasonably reject such an Indian offer
(especially if it were to be preceded by
background lobbying and spadework within
the NAM stalwarts and other active non-
NWS -- South Africa, Malaysia, Egypt, Iran,
Brazil, Mexico and others), and yet continue
to demand that India join the NPT as a non-
NWS, for that would be in violation of a
basic tenet of international law and expose
(and marginalize) their demand as
hegemonic.]
VIII. CAVEATS AND CONDITIONS
55. This is a tall order, undoubtedly -- to
have the nation decide to (unilaterally)
place the national nuclear arsenal on the
trading block in a bid to trigger a similar
commitment by others (when Pakistan
has determinedly been blocking
agreement on a FMCT in the Conference
on Disarmament in order to buy time to
accumulate massive amounts of fissile
material and expand its arsenal). But it
should be possible to do, for the nation
has a cast-iron case, with both the force
of argument and moral force on its side --
the seemingly 'realpolitik' levers
suggested in the preceding Section would
only be the icing on that moral cake. And
it would be worth doing so, it is
submitted, given the historic gain (of
ridding itself, and the world, of nuclear
weapons, once and for all and, with that,
of the dangers of an accidental or
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and
risks of escalation of any conflict to a level
above the nuclear threshold as well).
56. Such an enormous task will naturally
require a domestic, all party, consensus
as a pre-requisite -- it would obviously
be inconceivable without that. And
appropriate preparation, within GOI at
the official level through an inter-agency
process (given the large number of
'constituencies' -- strategic security
related Departments and organizations -
- involved), based on a thrashing out of
the possible security ramifications of the
above mentioned suggestions, as
perceived from the standpoint of different
actors within the security establishment.
(There really are none but this would need
to be appreciated, and possibly explained,
in order to pre-empt a war cry against
'unilateral' disbanding of the Indian
nuclear weapons capability and 'status'.)
57. A White Paper could be prepared for
this purpose, to establish that the optimal
role for the nuclear weapons in the
nation's possession was to serve as trading
'chips', to be exchanged for global
agreement on abolition of nuclear
weapons, i.e. to put them to politico-
diplomatic use.
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58. It could then be discussed, in-depth,
in a closed door, all Party, forum in the
relevant specialized bodies of Parliament
(serviced by strategic experts from all
fields -- military, technology, diplomacy
etc.). Red lines could be set, in respect of
the NPT, 'CTBT' etc, therein for
endorsement by open cross-party
deliberations in the (main) Parliament
Houses themselves. These would enable
GOI (MEA) to negotiate the seemingly
impossible external terrain outlined in the
preceding Section dexterously.
59. All this might appear, at first glance,
to be a no go, practically. Something that
might invite skepticism -- after all, it
might be argued, is it not exactly what
India was doing for long years prior to
Pokhran II, with scant success ?
60. But it is really not so. To take the
second objection first, there is a difference
in the situation pre-Pokhran and now --
and a huge one at that -- which is not
always appreciated while considering
contemporary India's capacity to
influence the discourse on global nuclear
disarmament.
61. That difference lies in the fact that in
the pre-Pokhran days, when India was in
an advocacy mode, it had very little to
bring to the negotiating table (while
making tall demands on others -- on the
NWS). That is no longer the case. In
seeking abolition of nuclear weapons now,
India would be doing so as a 'State with
Nuclear Weapons' (SNW) ready to close
down its own shop. That would be no
mean gain (for the 'non-proliferation
regime' and its protagonists), and
therefore cannot but weigh heavily with
all concerned, including India's detractors
from within the non-proliferation
fundamentalists' fold, while responding
to renewed Indian activism for nuclear
disarmament on the lines suggested here.
[Plus there would be the very welcome
consequence -- for the whole world -- of the
Pakistani arsenal being roped in as well, in
the process; something that is a source of
nightmares for everyone but for which
nobody has an answer. That would be a huge,
an even bigger, gain (for all nations, China
included -- though it may not be ready to
acknowledge that to India or in public),
which cannot but influence world reaction
to the Indian initiative(s).]
62. And as to the first objection (about
practicality), it is at heart a question of
conceptual clarity on the use(s) to which
the nation wishes to put its nuclear
arsenal (and military prowess and
politico-diplomatic standing, as a SNW)
in the ultimate analysis -- mere military
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and diplomatic profiling or to transact a
hard strategic bargain for having them
outlawed and actualizing the NWFW
vision -- which is the larger, long term,
strategic security interest of the nation
by any rational argument. The answer,
it is recommended, must be the latter --
i.e. trading them off for securing a world
without nuclear weapons. For nuclear
weapons are in no way essential, it
is submitted, for safeguarding India’s
strategic security for all time to come
and under all circumstances – not
at all. The real utility of nuclear
weapons is political, not military –
as a lever, and leveler, of  sorts. (This
latter proposition has been argued
in a separate forthcoming paper. Of
course, in the interregnum until a
NWFW materialises, the arsenal
would have to be ‘nurtured’, i.e.
developed, as per military
requirements without let or
hindrance.)
[In the absence of any such clear
overarching directive, there is at present
considerable confusion in the country
(including in senior decision-making circles
within GOI) on this basic question (of the
nation's fundamental strategic orientation)
-- which side of the nuclear divide is the
nation on: an aspiring 'NWS', interested in
securing some kind of a place under the
NPT Sun (with its unstated implication of
having to keep a low profile on nuclear
disarmament issues, as expedient for an
'emerging' country seeking to be
accommodated within the existing power
configuration), or a reluctant 'SNW' with
an undiminished interest in, and
commitment to, inducing a NWFW game-
changer in the international system.]
63. There is no contradiction in this
perspective whatsoever -- a world without
nuclear weapons could, without any
hesitation (or worry about accusations of
hypocrisy etc.), be projected to be the
nation's preferred outcome (for the future
naturally, since it hasn't happened as yet),
and the latter posture (of maintaining
preparedness meanwhile) an inescapable
duty (of the Government of the day) in
the present demanded by current ground
level realities, pending 'entelechy' of that
grand vision.
IX. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A
STRATEGY FOR CATALYZING THE 2015
REVIEW CONFERENCE BY SYNERGISING
WITH NAM
64. A confluence of developments
globally in the last few years, the May
2010 NPT Review Conference in
particular, has opened a window of
opportunity for India, for realizing its long
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cherished -- and now (after the recent
upheavals in Pakistan, casting grave
doubts about the safety and security of
its nuclear arsenal) also security impelled
-- aspiration of a world without nuclear
weapons.
[That RC took the trend (of the last three
RCs) of play of realpolitik (pressing for the
nuclear disarmament part of the essential
NPT bargain by the non-NWS, led by NAM
NPT parties) to a new high. As per the Final
Document of the 2010 RC adopted by
consensus, the NWS are required to report
(on the results of their commitments for
nuclear disarmament in that document (para
38 (c) above) to the 2014 Prepcom of the
next, 2015, RC for it (the 2015 Review
Conference)"to consider the next steps for
the full implementation of Article VI" -- the
first time ever the NPT parties have reached
the point of placing the question of
monitoring of "full implementation of
Article VI" on the table.  Though the NWS
were able to ward off NAM & other non-
NWS demands for even more categorical
formulations (on disarmament aspects in
general), they were (by all accounts) on the
defensive - and this is the (source of an)
opportunity that, it is submitted, needs to be
recognised as such and grasped.]
65. This fortuitous development - of the
NPT Review Conference juggernaut
having been set in motion in the right
direction, of nuclear disarmament -- offers
a favourable setting, with just the right
lead time, for a fresh Indian initiative (for
actualising the vision of the RGAP of
1988) to bear fruit. A carefully crafted
strategy, timed to take advantage of the
NPT review process momentum and
markers in the next years leading up to
the 2015 (as well as of the ripened
international public opinion, reflected in
the surge of proposals and initiatives for
nuclear disarmament in recent years) can
yield very good dividends.
[Another favourable factor in this
regard is the keenness of an overwhelming
majority of nations to see a successful
denouement of the 'CTBT' process, which is
in limbo at present. Although this is
primarily because of the inability of the US
to get its Senate to ratify the 'CTBT' text,
India is also one of the countries named in
its Annex XIV as those whose accession would
be required before it can enter into force.
This feature provides it (India) with a unique
opportunity for pressing for abolition of
nuclear weapons. Details in this regard
would be dealt with in a forthcoming paper
and are not dwelt upon here.]
66. This could be done by India taking a
conscious decision to make politico-
diplomatic use of the nation's nuclear
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arsenal by trading them off for a NWFW
-- to turn the national nuclear prowess,
in other words, into a 'global public good'
-- as detailed in paras 51-54 in the
Section on "Overcoming the
Contradiction: Politico-diplomatic Use of
Indian Nuclear Weapons". It could
announce readiness to give up, i.e. 'roll
back' (although that term has to be used
with caution because of its loaded
historical origins), the national nuclear
arsenal on condition of a matching
commitment by others.
[This step would need to be taken in
close coordination with NAM, on the basis
of prior lobbying and spadework. The aim
would be to so position the Indian posture
that its nuclear weapons capability comes
to be regarded by NAM as a lever, placed at
their disposal notionally, for clinching the
basic NPT bargain at the 2015 NPT Review
Conference by extracting a legally binding
commitment from the NWS to match the
Indian offer in some specified time-frame.
Under Iran's Chairmanship from 2012, NAM
could hopefully be enlisted in support of such
an Indian move.
And it should be done as soon as possible -
to allow maximum time for the secondary
effects triggered by the Indian announcement
to play themselves out and generate
momentum between now and the 2015 NPT
RC preparatory cycle build up, which would
get underway from May next onwards (when
the first meeting of the Prepcom of the 2015
RC is due to be held). By thus upping the
ante in advance of the RC, the Indian
initiative should be able to 'catalyse' it, while
finessing the India-NPT stand-off in the
service of the grand goal of a Nuclear
Weapon Free World.]
67. For this to be possible, the nation's
overall approach to nuclear weapons
would naturally need to be reviewed
internally, within the security
establishment, first. The continued utility
of nuclear weapons would need to be
examined afresh, in the light of changing
(and changed) circumstances facing the
nation today as compared to 1998, with a
view to formalising the recommended
preference for putting them to politico-
diplomatic use by trading them off for a
NWFW. A White Paper may need to be
prepared, on the basis of such a review, in
order to facilitate a national consensus
across the political spectrum.
68. An initiative by India in the UN and
in other international forums, in liaison
with others active in nuclear
disarmament, could then be planned on
that basis -- with conviction (rather than
mere stepped up 'profiling' externally,
sans conceptual clarity domestically on
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the use(s) to which the national nuclear
arsenal and capability is to be put).
69. It would be India's turn to preside
over the UN Security Council (UN SC)
again in November 2012. Nuclear
disarmament could be the big ticket item
India brings up on that occasion. That
opportunity could be utilised to focus
attention on the dangers, and
unimaginable consequences, of nuclear
terrorism and on the consequent need for
redemption now, at the earliest without
any further delay, of the oft repeated
solemn pledges -- of almost all nations of
the world, the NWS included, in some
form or another in different fora from time
to time -- for doing away with nuclear
weapons altogether (in order to plug the
possibility of leakage of war heads
or fissile material to terrorist groups at
root).
[The spectre of nuclear terrorism is the
key spur to the current upsurge in favour of
nuclear disarmament. There is widespread
recognition across the globe of the need for
a more effective non-proliferation regime
and, as a corollary (or pre-requisite rather
for that), for progress on the nuclear
disarmament front, as noted earlier. This
again is a favourable factor for disarmament
activists, translating as it does (or at least
can, if not already so) into a realization of
the need for urgency of reaching closure on
nuclear weapons now (with states wanting
to retain their nuclear weapons for their
perceived 'strategic stability' or other security
benefits no longer granted, or allowed, a
'veto' over this reasoned sentiment).
Although a world Nuclear Security
Summit was held in April 2010 at US
initiative, and is to be followed by another
in April 2012 in Seoul, these are gatherings
held outside the official UN system (with
participation limited to selected invitees
capable of contributing, in the US
assessment, to awareness raising and opinion
building spadework that these gatherings are
essentially limited to undertaking) and the
subject has perhaps not figured in the UN
Security Council in a formal way. It may
therefore be appropriate for India to seek a
UN SC meeting on this theme during its
Presidentship, taking off from the 2012
Nuclear Security Summit (that would have
taken place by then, six months prior to it),
to decide on effective follow up measures in
the highest security forum available to the
international community at large.
Further, the meeting could perhaps be
convened at Summit level -- the UN Secretary
General's 2008 suggestion for a Summit level
meeting of the UN SC on disarmament lies
untouched, as it were, that India might try
to pick up and link with this theme -- by
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seeking to build upon the last Summit
level UN SC meeting on "Nuclear Non-
proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament"
convened by the USA in September 2009
(which had adopted Resolution 1887
avowedly "to create the conditions for a
world without nuclear weapons").]
70. It may then be the right occasion to
place on record the major announcement
on India's readiness to turn its national
nuclear capability into a 'global public
good' (paragraph 66), so that it can
become the reference point, hopefully, for
a re-framing of the international debate
on international security issues anew. It
would be the first time that a nuclear
weapons power would have offered
to give up its nuclear weapons, for
none of  the NWS, China included,
has done so as yet. Hopefully, such
an offer might trigger a demand for
others – the NWS in particular – to
follow suit.
4 [This would obviously require intense
preparation and spade-work with all
members of the UN SC and others
concerned; above all a stepped up, and more
earnest, Indo-US dialogue in pursuit of US
President Obama's 2010 New Delhi
commitment to work (together with India)
"to forge a strong partnership to lead global
efforts for non-proliferation and universal
and non-discriminatory global nuclear
disarmament". Similar, albeit less intense
may be, dialogues with other P-5 countries,
and with NAM and other non-NWS active on
nuclear disarmament issues (as well as with
select think-tanks and advocacy groups as
identified in Section II), would need to be
put in place right away, given the none too
long lead time left between now and then.]
71. A UN SC Resolution (building upon
Resolution 1887 adopted by it in
September 2009) could then be thought
of, and attempted, accordingly to embody
such a consensus on redeeming the
nuclear weapons abolition pledge, if it can
be forged -- even if it be a minimalist one,
'in-principle', only, well short of the formal
Indian position (seeking no less than a
legally binding commitment for time-
bound and total elimination of all nuclear
weapons from all nations).
[In case even a minimalist consensus
(on a Resolution on nuclear disarmament)
is not forthcoming, it might at least be
possible to secure one on action oriented
deliberation on effective ways of preventing
any possible act of nuclear terrorism (and
on agreed principles and procedures for
tracing it back to, and affixing responsibility
on, states on or from whose territory the non-
state actors perpetrate the act, should they
nevertheless manage to do it).
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And a (brainstorming) dialogue on that
(technically complex) subject, a tangible gain
in itself, might possibly create space for a
discussion also on the obvious 'at root'
solution of the nuclear terrorism problem --
of doing away with nuclear weapons
altogether, as the best way of forestalling that
danger (already hinted at by India at the
Washington Nuclear Security Summit in April
2010) -- without the NWS (who are averse to
accepting nuclear disarmament on the formal
multilateral agenda) opposing it in that
context at least, hopefully.
The lowered sights here should need no
explanation. Working for a world without
nuclear weapons will obviously require a
sustained initiative, with each step seeking
to build upon the previous one in a graduated
manner over a period of time and in liaison
with other like-minded nations. This exercise
in the UN SC (suggested above) would
therefore only be the beginning of a long
haul, and it may be advisable to limit its
objectives to triggering the critical first step
-- of securing consensus on an 'in-principle'
kind of commitment, be it non-legalistic and
implicit, capable of opening the door for a
discussion on (eventual) abolition of nuclear
weapons in some (not entirely unspecified,
even if not clearly time-bound) future -- so
that the ball is set rolling. Everything else
-- and there would obviously be much left to
be done -- can follow in due course, with
the process gathering momentum hopefully
in every subsequent 'round' of deliberations-
cum-negotiations, once a beginning has been
made. Leaving everything else negotiable for
subsequent parleys would also have the
advantage of allowing a wider sense of
ownership of the nuclear weapons abolition
endeavour, that should help in making it a
sustained one. The large body of work of
prestigious think-tanks, academics and
activists world-wide would be of immense
value at that stage, once the start-up friction/
resistance at the inter-Governmental level
has been overcome (and the need of the hour
shifts to a more practical agenda -- of
injecting substance to the process of
'cleaning up' and eradication, of weapons
and weapons-grade fissile material).
Pakistan (and Israel) would need to be
tackled, as also Russia and France (as well
as China). The resistance of the latter three
might possibly be in a different, less difficult,
category - not as die-hard may be, as
Pakistan, which might try to take cover under
the 'national survival in the face of an
existential threat from a more powerful
neighbour' security argument for withholding
assent).
Ways of holding them all, the P-5 in
particular, to the by now well established
norm (even if it be an 'imagined' one)
against nuclear weapons, manifested in
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myriad commitments for doing away
with these WMDs made by them over the
years (as responsible members of the
international community) in a variety of
international compacts, the NPT RCs above
all in case of the NWS, would need to be
devised through solid, and skillful,
spadework (in concert with other powers
whose relations with Pakistan and China are
free of the kind of bilateral sensitivities that
mark India's relations with these two nuclear
armed neighbours). China can be expected
to be mindful of its image internationally,
so may not be able to come out with its
reservations (on its being required to make
a legal commitment to eliminate its nuclear
weapons in a specified time-frame)
in the open brazenly, as Pakistan could well
be imagined to do unhesitatingly.]
72. Successful or not in getting the world
to rid itself of its nuclear weapons, an
Indian initiative on the lines discussed
above should, at the very least, be able to
influence the disarmament (and
international security) dialectic
positively. That, in itself, would be a gain
incompare and a distinctive contribution
in keeping with the best traditions of the
nation's historical trajectories.
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
AP Additional Protocol (to the safeguards agreements concluded by members
of the IAEA with the agency, with a view to authorizing it additional
powers to verify the pledges made by them in regard to non use of
nuclear energy for non- peaceful purposes)
CD Conference on Disarmament (in Geneva), the standing body designated
by the UN for negotiation of all disarmament agreements
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FD Final Document
FMCT Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty
GOI Government of India
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
MEA Ministry of External Affairs
NAM Non-aligned movement
NPT Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWC Nuclear Weapons Convention
NWFW Nuclear Weapons Free World
NWFZ Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
NWS Nuclear Weapons State (defined, under the NPT, as one which  possessed
nuclear weapons as of 1.1.1967)
non-NWS A non-Nuclear Weapons State (defined, under the NPT, as one which
did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1.1.1967)
RC/NPT RC Review Conference of the NPT (held five yearly)
RGAP Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (submitted to the UN GA in 1988)
SNW A state with (i.e. in possession of) nuclear weapons
UNGA/UN GA UN General Assembly
UNSC/UN SC UN Security Council
UNSG/UN SG UN Secretary General
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
1967 FIVE Another way of referring to the NWS
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(http://www.ccnr.org/8_nation_declaration.html)
NAM Plan of Action to 2010 NPT Review Conference; 2010
(http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47)
QUASI-OFFICIAL INITIATIVES:
Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; 1999
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/forum/tokyo9907/index.html)
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; 1996
(http://www.prop1.org/2000/canbrp01.htm)
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Year                                                         Proposal
UNGA RESOLUTIONS
2009   UNGA Res. 64/47 "Renewed determination toward the total elimination of nw" x CTBT ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
2009   UNGA Res. 64/55 "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the ICJ [...]" ? CTBT ? ?  lb ? ? ?
2009   UNGA Res. 64/57 "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world" ? x CTBT ?
2009   UNGA Res. 64/53 "Nuclear Disarmament" x CTBT ?  lb ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  lb ? ?
 OTHER OFFICIAL LEVEL PROPOSALS
2011   Berlin Statement by Foreign Ministers ? ? ? CTBT ? ? ? ? ? ? x  33 x
2009   Brown: The Road to 2010 CTBT ?  20 ? ? ? x ?  5 23 ?  25 X ? ?  24 x x ? 26
2009   Obama: Speech in Prague x ? x CTBT ? ? ? x ? ? 7
2009   UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office: Lifting the Nuclear Shadow x ? CTBT ? ? ?  5 ? ? x ?
2008   Letter from President N. Sarkozy to H. E. Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, SG of the UN CTBT ? ? ? ? ?
2008   Ban Ki-moon: The UN and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World (5-point proposal) ? ? x CTBT x ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
2007   Model Nuclear Weapons Convention ? ? x ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 13
2005   Seven-Nation Initiative: Declaration by the seven Foreign Ministers ? ? ? CTBT ? x ? ? ? x ?
2000   NPT 2000 RevCon Final Document: 13 practical steps ? CTBT ?  ? x ? ? ? ?  8 ? ? ABM ? ?
1999   Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament ? ? ? CTBT ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? caution ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
1998   The New Agenda Coalition: Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs ? ? ? CTBT ?  lb ? x ? x ? ?  lb ? ? ? ?
1996   Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons ? ? x ? ? CTBT ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ABM ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
SEMI-OFFICIAL INITIATIVES
2010   Claes, Dehaene, Michel, Verhofstadt: Towards a nuclear weapon-free world ? ? CTBT ?  28 ? ? ? x ? x
2009   Schmidt, Weizsäcker, Bahr, Genscher: Toward a nuclear-free world ? ? CTBT ?  lb ? x ? ABM ?
2009   Juppé, Norlain, Richard, Rocard: Pour un désarmement nucléaire global x x x ? ? ?
2009   Kwasniewski, Mazowieski, Walesa: The Unthinkable becomes Thinkable ? ? CTBT ? ? ? x
2009   Lubbers, van der Stoel, van Mierlo, Korthals Altes: Toward A Nuclear Weapon Free World ? x ? x ? x
2009   Nakasone: 11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament ? ? CTBT ? ? ? ? ?  5 ? ? ? x ?
2009   Nordli, Brundtland, Willoch, Bondevik, Stoltenberg: A Nuclear Weapon-Free Wor ? ?
 
? ? ? avoid ? x 17
2008   D'Alema, Fini, La Malfa, Parisi, Calogero: For a world free of nuclear weapons CTBT ? x
2008   Hurd, Rifkind, Owen, Robertson: Start worrying and learn to ditch the bomb ? ? CTBT ?  12 ?  ? X 10
2007   Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, Nunn: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons x ? x ? CTBT x ? ? ? x ? ?
UNOFFICIAL PROPOSALS
2011   Getting to Zero: Goals and Objectives ? ? ? CTBT ? ? ?  9 ? 21 Addresses US, Russia, UK
2010   Global Zero: Action Plan ? ? ? ? CTBT ? x ? ? ? ?  5 ? x x x ? ? ? ? ? Tmeframe: 2010-2030
2009   Nuclear Age Peace Foundation: A Roadmap to Abolition ? CTBT ? ? ? ? x limited ? x x ? x ? Timeframe: 10-17 years
2009   ElBaradei: 5 Steps towards abolishing Nuclear Weapons x ? CTBT ? ? ? ? ? ?
2009   Partnership for a Secure America: 10 Key Steps for our Security x x x ? x x ?  ?  x 3
2009   Warsaw Reflection Group: Arms Control Revisited 18 CTBT ? ? 11
2009   International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND): Report ? ? ? CTBT ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? limited ? ?  27 ?  31 ? ? ?  30 ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? x ? 32
2008   FAS, UCS, NRDC: Toward True Security ? ? CTBT ?  nb ? ? ? x ? ? ? ?
 
x nb 3
2008   Mayors for Peace: Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Timeframe: 2015/2020
2008   IISS / Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Abolishing Nuclear Weapons CTBT ?  12 ? x ? ?  5 ? 11 x ? ? ? ? x ? ? 13, 14, 15, 16
2007   Pugwash: Goals of P. in its 11th Quinquennium 2007-2012 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  nb ? ? ? ? ? ? x ? ?
2007   Int'l Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe: Declaration ? ? CTBT ? x x ? 4 ? x ? ?   ? ? ? ? ? x
2006   WMD Commission (Blix Commission): Weapons of Terror ? ? x ? CTBT ?  nb ? ? ? ? ? x 2 ? ? ? ? 22 ? ?  lb ? ? ? ?  ?  11 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
1997   National Academy of Sciences: The Future of US nuclear weapons policy ? ? 6 x nb x ? ? ? ? ? ABM x nb ? 3
1995   Abolition 2000: Founding Statement ? ? x ? CTBT ? ? ? ? ? ? x nb ? 1 ? ? ? ?
Legal framework Political frameworkRationale / 
Axiom
Non-proliferation Peaceful usesDisarmament measures
Legend: ? : Explicit statement x: Implicit, inferred or partial statement lb: Legally binding nb: Non-legally binding
Notes:
*1: Establish an international agency to promote and support the development of sustainable and environmentally safe energy sources.
*2: Avoid developing nuclear weapons with new military capabilities or for new missions and not to blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons.
*3: The proposal offers recommendations for US policy only.
*4: Enhance cooperation on the development of missile defense systems according to the Joint Declaration on New Strategic Relationship of 2002 and to consult with the 
United Kingdom, France and China on their potential participation.
*5: Develop warhead dismantlement verification techniques.
*6: Examine if the prohibition of nuclear weapons is desirable and possible; identify and promote the creation of the necessary conditions, notably an effective verification 
system as well as an international security system.
*7: Accepts the idea of “Fuel Banks” under multilateral control. But it does not pronounce on multilateral enrichment centers.
*8: Complete and implement the Trilateral Initiative between Russia, the US and the IAEA. Initiate the further development of verification capabilities.
*9: Extend the US-Russian START I Treaty.
*10: Consider the Additional Protocol as being the verification standard required under Article III of the NPT.
*11: discuss the issue
*12: Homogenize record-keeping and archiving of data related to nuclear programs. Establish an international/universal fissile material accountancy system.
*13: Adopt domestic legislation criminalizing the act of illicit proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials.
*14: Close and just prior to reaching zero, consider entrusting an international body with a small nuclear arsenal.
*15: Consider the option of maintaining virtual arsenals.
*16: Secure the effective re-training and/or re-employment of those people possessing the know-how to build nuclear weapons.
*17: Eliminate all nuclear weapons production plants.
*18: Zero may as well be understood as zero warheads deployed.
*19: Stop uranium mining; special recommendations for India, Pakistan, Israel and the official nuclear weapon states.
*20: Reduce and monitor fissile material stockpiles.
*21: Resolve all outstanding issues/disputes on the role and status of Missile Defense systems.
*22: Missile defense should be accompanied by cooperative development programs and confidence-building measures to avoid negative backlashes/repercussions on 
international peace and security, including the initiation or exacerbation of arms races.
*23: Block the financing of illicit proliferation networks.
*24: Promote Research and Development on proliferation-resistant features for civil nuclear technology and facilities.
*25: The UNSC to pass a generic resolution adopting in advance a set of measures to be applied in future cases of non-compliance.
*26: Institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and strengthen it by opening participation.
*27: Declare no use against NPT-compliant non-nuclear weapon states.
*28: Declare use of nw illegal.
*29: Australia should reduce the role of nw in ist security policies, review reliance on extended deterrence by the US.
*30: Application of the AP should be condition of all nuclear exports, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) should develop criteria for cooperation with nnws, the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) should be reconstituted within the UN system
*31: The SC should state that NPT withdrawal will be regarded as prima facie a threat to peace and security.
*32: Conventional arms imbalances should be addressed; disarmament education should be enhanced.
*33: We will actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, based on our conviction that education is a powerful tool for mobilizing further disarmament and 
non-proliferation efforts globally by enhancing awareness and understanding among our citizens.
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Res. 65/56 "Nuclear Disarmament"; 2010
Res. 65/59 "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world"; 2010
Res. 65/72 "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons"; 2010
Res. 65/76   "Follow-up on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
Legality of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons";
Res. 65/80 "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons"; 2010
OTHER OFFICIAL LEVEL PROPOSALS:
UN Secretary General's Five point proposal;  2008
Berlin Statement by Foreign Ministers; April 30, 2011
Seven-Nation Initiative: Declaration by the seven Foreign Ministers; 2005
The New Agenda Coalition: Declaration by Ministers for Foreign Affairs 1998
Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (Costa Rica and Malaysia); 2008
NAM Plan of Action to 2010 NPT Review Conference; 2010
2000 NPT  RevCon Final Document: 13 practical steps; 2000
2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan; 2010
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QUASI- OFFICIAL INITIATIVES:
WMD Commission (Blix Commission): Weapons of Terror; 2006
Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; 1999
Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; 1996
Mayors for Peace: Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol; 2008
Nordli, Brundtland, Willoch, Bondevik, et al A Nuclear Weapon-Free World; 2009
Claes, Dehaene, Michel, Verhofstadt: Towards a nuclear weapon-free    world; 2010
Schmidt, Weizsäcker, Bahr, Genscher: Toward a nuclear-free world; 2009
Juppé, Norla, Richar, Rocard: Pour un désarment nucléaire global; 2009
UNOFFICIAL PROPOSALS:
A Global Law to Ban Nuclear Weapons - Middle Powers Initiative, 2011
Getting to Zero: Goals and Objectives; 2011
Global Zero: Action Plan; 2010
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation: A Roadmap to Abolition; 2009
Pugwash Eleventh (2007-2012) Quinquennium; 2007
Pugwash Milan document; 2010
The Abolition 2000 (Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons); 1995
Elbaradei: 5 Steps towards abolishing Nuclear Weapons; 2009
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ANNEXURE III
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS
BASED ON THE INDIAN STANDPOINT
The essential elements of the Indian
standpoint could be outlined as follows,
based on the 1988 RGAP and the 2006
Working Paper submitted by India at the
Conference on Disarmament, and various
policy statements from time to time:
A legally binding commitment by all nations
to
I. The overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition of nuclear weapons
based on
a) Universality, i.e. all nations to be
covered;
b) Comprehensiveness, i.e. all
categories of weapons to be covered;
c) Time-bound framework, i.e. the
above mentioned commitments not
to be left as a “long term” goal for
the indefinite future;
d) Effective multilateral verification
measures;
e) Non-discriminatory application of
all provisions, i.e. with full equality
between all nations. (This is expected
to follow from the above but is listed
as a separate desideratum,
nevertheless, to cover any
unanticipated aspects.)
II. Interim (and collateral) measures, for
facilitating the above and for prevention of
nuclear war, risk reduction, etc.:
a) Non-proliferation, both
♦ vertical (inter alia, through a
comprehensive ban on nuclear
testing and effectively verifiable
control of further production of
fissile materials for weapons
purposes) as well as
♦ horizontal (NPT like
injunctions against transfers
etc., but from outside the
NPT; export controls;
n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y
multilateralisation of the
nuclear fuel cycle)
b) ‘No-First-Use’, leading logically to
‘Non-use or threat of use’ (of nuclear
weapons)
c) De-alerting – i.e. separation of
warheads from delivery vehicles.
There are, of course, several other desiderata
that have been articulated by Indian leaders
and diplomats from time to time, depending
upon the occasion and forum, but the above
would appear to constitute the core of the
Indian position, the bare essentials without
which India would seem to find it difficult
to go along with any proposal.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
60
[This is, of course, a matter of reading the
Indian official position for nowhere is it (the
bottom line) spelt out in as many words. Nor
is it likely to be for the rationale,
and limits, of strategic policies have
invariably (and understandably) to be left
inexplicit.
Thus e.g. a Nuclear Weapons Prohibition
Convention, which India is an ardent
advocate of (and which is well known to form
an important plank of its policy), has not
been included in the above - on the premise
that while it is indeed a desideratum for
Indian policy, it would fall, in the ultimate
analysis, in the category of 'means' and not
an 'end'. I.e. if it turns out that conditions
are not propitious for securing a NWC, while
a legally binding commitment to the
NWFW goal appears separately to be within
sight, India is unlikely to spurn it or allow
the 'best to become the enemy of the good'.
But this is unlikely to be true of any of the
five elements listed in section I. above]
These elements can therefore provide a
framework for analysis of the various
proposals on the anvil internationally – the
extent to which their operative provisions
include these elements in some form or
another, or are at least compatible with these
elements (or, to put it the other way round,
are at least not incompatible with these
elements), would be a good indicator of the
degree of congruence, or potential
convergence, between them and the Indian
position.
Annexure IV attempts such an exercise for
selected proposals that subscribe,
categorically, to the goal of nuclear
disarmament aimed, eventually, at total
elimination of all nuclear weapons of all
nations, leading to their global abolition a
la the biological and chemical weapons. The
chart in Annexure IV A tabulates these
selected proposals, analysed within this
framework of the Indian standpoint to
facilitate an overall bird’s eye view. And
Annexure IV B presents the same results
individually, in case of each proposal, in a
textual manner more suited for a detailed
look within (at the contents of each proposal)
individually.


















































































































































































































































Legally binding commitment to Overall Goal of Nuclear 
Disarmament leading to abolition based on
Interim (and collateral) measures to facilitate abolition and for risk reduction and 
prevention of nuclear warYear SELECTED PROPOSALS
UNGA RESOLUTIONS
2010 UNGA Res 65/80 Implicit Implicit Implicit Implicit N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. N.A. POU  N.A. Resolution calls for prohibition of use. Sponsored by India. 









Advocates a NWC while seeking follow up on ICJ advisory but not 
comprehensive
2010 UNGA Res 65/56 Yes Implicit Yes Yes* Implicit 'CTBT' Yes Yes Silent NFU Yes
*Except for reference to the NPT as the mainstay of non-
proliferation and nuclear disarmament, which also obliges India to 
abstain on this NAM favoured resolution. 
2010 UNGA Res 65/72 Yes Yes No No Skirts it 'CTBT' FMCT NPT+ Silent but implicit No No
Operative thrust on universalization of NPT, ''CTBT', FMCT, and 
Model Additional Protocol of the IAEA, while paying lip service to 
global elimination of nuclear weapons. Hence supported by NWS 
except PRC (which abstains, possibly because of emphasis on 
transparency in the process of nuclear disarmament). India (Pakistan 
and Israel) too abstain, because of reference to NPT.
2010 UNGA Res 65/59 N.A.
Lip 
service No No Silent Silent Silent N.P.T. Silent Silent Silent
Operational thrust is on universalization of NPT, India votes against 
it. 
OTHER OFFICAL PROPOSALS




Implicit 'CTBT' FMCT Implicit Silent Implicit Silent Value lies more in the spirit of the proposal than its letter
2011 Berlin Ten Nation Initiative
Not 
categorical Implicit Silent Implicit Silent 'CTBT' FMCT NPT+* Silent Silent Silent
*(Model) Additional protocol of IAEA. Espousal of NWFW only to 
better push non-proliferation measures. 
2005 Seven Nation Initiative No N.A. N.A. No N.A. 'CTBT' Yes
Universality of 
NPT Yes N.A. N.A. Focus entirely on non-proliferation. No demands on NWS at all.
1998 The New Agenda Coalition Yes Implicit Silent Yes Silent 'CTBT' FMCT Implicit Silent NFU Yes Good but NPT oriented.
2008 Model Nuclear Weapons Convention Yes Yes Yes Yes* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N.A. N.A. * Special status to NPT NWS 
2010 NAM Plan of Action to the NPT Review Conference Implicit Yes Yes Yes Silent 'CTBT' + FMCT + Implicit Implicit POU Yes Unexceptionable. No reference to NPT.
QUASI-OFFICIAL PROPOSALS
2006 WMD Blix Commission Silent Silent Silent Implicit Implicit 'CTBT' Yes Yes Silent Yes Yes Weak on nuclear disarmament, more on non-proliferation.
1996





implicitly Yes Yes Yes N.A.* Yes Yes
*Predates the idea. Unexceptionable comprehensive and equitable 
approach




categorical 'CTBT' FMCT + Yes Silent NFU Yes Heavy focus on “Stop and reverse proliferation in South Asia”. 
2008 Mayors for Peace Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol Yes Yes Yes Yes Silent* Implicit Yes Implicit Silent Implicit Implicit
*Protocol to be attached to the NPT (leading to a NWC), so NPT 
provisions will apply
2010
Claes, Dehaene, Michel, Verhofstadt: Towards a 
nuclear weapon-free world Yes Yes Implicit Yes
Silent but 
Implicit 'CTBT' FMCT Yes Silent Yes Silent
2009
Nordli, Brundtland, Willoch, Bondevik, Stoltenberg: A 
Nuclear Weapon-Free World Yes Yes
Silent but 
implicit Implicit Silent Silent Yes Yes Silent Silent Silent Focus mainly on Europe.
UNOFFICIAL PROPOSALS
2011 Middle Powers Initiative Yes Yes Implicit Yes Implicit Implicit FMCT Yes Implicit Yes Silent Strong on International humaniatrian law. 
2010 Global Zero: Action Plan Yes Yes Yes Implicit Implicit * 'CTBT' FMCT NPT Strong Silent Weakly
*Stresses effective verification drawing upon bilateral US/Russian 
experience. 
2009
A Roadmap to Abolition - Nuclear Age Peace 
Foundation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Silent but 
Implicit 'CTBT' Yes NPT Silent Silent Silent
2011 Getting to Zero: Goals and Objectives Yes Yes Silent Implicit Silent 'CTBT' Yes Silent Silent Silent Silent Information available sketchy 
1995 Abolition 2000: Founding Statement Yes Implicit Yes Yes
Silent but 
Implicit 'CTBT' + Yes Implicit Silent Yes Silent
2007
Pugwash: Goals of Pugwash in its 11th Quinquennium 
2007-2012 Implicit Silent Silent Implicit Silent Yes Yes Yes Silent Yes Silent Weak operationally
2009 El Baradei: 5 Steps towards abolishing NW Yes Implicit Implicit Silent Silent 'CTBT' FMCT Silent Yes Silent Silent Forthright (but not compehensive)
Legend:
NFU - No-first use
POU - Prohibition of use
1  Almost none of the proposals stress the non-discriminatory aspect here
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ANNEXURE IV B




I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Lip
service only
a) Universality: N.A.
b) Comprehensiveness: Lip service
c) Time-bound framework: No
d) Non-discriminatory application: No
e) Multilateral verification: Silent
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
Silent
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Silent
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
NPT
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Silent
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Silent
REMARKS: Operational thrust is against
Israel, and seeks universalization of NPT
in that context but names India (and
Pakistan, along with Israel), obliging India
to vote against it.
UNGA Res 65/80:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Implicit
a) Universality: Implicit
b) Comprehensiveness: Implicit
c) Time-bound framework: Implicit
d) Non-discriminatory application:
Implicit
e) Multilateral verification: N.A. but
implicit
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
N.A.
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b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): N.A.
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
N.A.
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: N.A.
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: POU
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: N.A.
REMARKS: Resolution calls for prohibition
of use. Sponsored by India, not on nuclear
disarmament but for prevention of nuclear
war.
UNGA Res 65/56:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Yes
b) Comprehensiveness: Implicit
c) Time-bound framework: Yes
d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes*
e) Multilateral verification: Implicit
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Yes
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
NPT
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: No
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: NFU
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Yes
REMARKS: *Except for reference to the
NPT as the “cornerstone of nuclear non-
proliferation and nuclear disarmament”, and
the call for universalisation of the
NPT implicit in its call for the “full
implementation” of the 2010 NPT RC Action
Plan, which constrain India to abstain on
this NAM favoured resolution.
UNGA Res 65/72:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Yes
b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
c) Time-bound framework: No
d) Non-discriminatory application: No
e) Multilateral verification: Skirts it
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
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a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): FMCT
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
NPT plus
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: silent but implicit
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: No
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: No
REMARKS: Operative thrust on
universalization of NPT, CTBT, FMCT, and
Model Additional Protocol of the IAEA,
while paying lip service to global
elimination of nuclear weapons. Hence
supported by NWS except  China (which
abstains, possibly because of emphasis on
transparency in the process of nuclear
disarmament). India (Pakistan and Israel)
too abstain, because of  the reference to the
NPT.
UNGA Res 65/76
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament




c) Time-bound framework: Yes
d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
e) Multilateral verification: Yes
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
Implicit in Nuclear Weapons Convention
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Implicit in Nuclear
Weapons Convention
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
N.A. but implicit
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: N.A.
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Silent (N.A.)
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: N.A.
REMARKS: Seeks a Nuclear Weapons
Convention as part of  follow up to the
ICJ Advisory regarding obligation of NWS
and others to negotiate in good faith for
nuclear disarmament and deliver, but not
comprehensive in scope
OTHER OFFICIAL PROPOSALS
UN Secretary General’s 5-point
proposal:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes




c) Time-bound framework: Silent
d) Non-discriminatory application: Silent
but Implicit
e) Multilateral verification: Silent but
Implicit
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): FMCT
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Implicit
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Implicit
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Silent
REMARKS: Value lies more in the spirit of
the proposal than its letter.
Berlin Ten Nation Initiative:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Not categorical
b) Comprehensiveness: Implicit
c) Time-bound framework: Silent
d) Non-discriminatory application: Implicit
e) Multilateral verification: Silent
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): FMCT
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
NTP plus (Additional Protocol)
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Silent
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Silent
REMARKS: Espousal of NWFW only to
better push non-proliferation measures.
Seven Nation Initiative:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: No
a) Universality: No
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b) Comprehensiveness: N.A.
c) Time-bound framework: N.A.
d) Non-discriminatory application: No
e) Multilateral verification: N.A.
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Yes
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Universality of NPT
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Yes
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: N.A.
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: N.A.
REMARKS: Focus entirely on non-
proliferation. No demands on NWS at all.
New Agenda Coalition:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Yes
b) Comprehensiveness: Implicit
c) Time-bound framework: Silent
d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
e) Multilateral verification: Silent
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): FMCT
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Implicit
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: NFU
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Yes
REMARKS: Good but NPT oriented.
Model Nuclear Weapons Convention:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Yes
b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
c) Time-bound framework: Yes
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d) Non-discriminatory application: Special
status to NWS in administrative
mechanism
e) Multilateral verification: Yes
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
Yes
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Yes
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Yes
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Yes
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: N.A.
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: N.A.
REMARKS: Uses NPT NWS categorization,
and so a special status to them in the
administrative mechanism provided for in
it.
NAM 2010 Plan of Action:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Implicit
b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
c) Time-bound framework: Yes
d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
e) Multilateral verification: Silent
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT plus
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): FMCT plus
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Implicit
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Implicit
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: POU
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Yes
REMARKS: Unexceptionable in its
approach, no reference to NPT.
QUASI-OFFICIAL PROPOSALS
WMD Blix Commission
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Weakly
a) Universality: Silent
b) Comprehensiveness: Silent
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c) Time-bound framework: Silent
d) Non-discriminatory application:
Implicit
e) Multilateral verification: Implicit
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Yes
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Yes
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Yes
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Yes
REMARKS: Weak on nuclear disarmament,
more focus on non-proliferation.
Canberra Commission on elimination
of nuclear weapons:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Yes
b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
c) Time-bound framework: Yes, implicitly
d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
e) Multilateral verification: Yes, implicitly
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
Yes
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Yes
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Yes
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: N.A.*
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Yes
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles:: Yes
REMARKS: *Predates the idea of
multilateral control over the fuel cycle.
Unexceptionable approach, that is not dated
despite being of 1995/6 vintage.
Mayors for Peace: Hiroshima –
Nagasaki Protocol:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Yes
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b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
c) Time-bound framework: Yes
d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
e) Multilateral verification: Silent
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
Implicit
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Yes
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Implicit
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: POU, Implicit
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Implicit
REMARKS: *Protocol to be attached to the
NPT leading to a NWC, so NPT provisions
will apply.
Tokyo Forum:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes, faintly
a) Universality: Yes
b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
c) Time-bound framework: Silent
d) Non-discriminatory application: Not
categorical
e) Multilateral verification: Not
categorical
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): FMCT +
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Yes
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: NFU
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Yes
REMARKS: Heavy focus on “Stop and
reverse proliferation in South Asia”.
Nordli, Brundtland, Willoch,
Bondevik, Stoltenberg: A Nuclear
Weapon-Free World
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes








e) Multilateral verification: Silent
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
Silent
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Yes
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Yes
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Silent
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Silent
REMARKS: Focus mainly on Europe
Claes, Dehaene, Michel, Verhofstadt:
Towards a nuclear weapon-free world
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Yes
b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
c) Time-bound framework: Implicit
d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
e) Multilateral verification: Silent but
Implicit
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): FMCT
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Yes
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Yes
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Silent
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Article VI Forum (Middle Powers
Initiative):
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes




c) Time-bound framework: Implicit
d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
e) Multilateral verification: Implicit
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
Implicit
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): FMCT
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Yes
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Implicit
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Yes
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Implicit
REMARKS: Well-focused, Strong on
International humanitarian law.
Getting to Zero: Goals and Objectives
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Yes
b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
c) Time-bound framework: Silent
d) Non-discriminatory application:
Implicit
e) Multilateral verification: Silent
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Yes
Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Silent
Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of the
fuel cycle: Silent
‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU) or
threat of use: Silent
De-alerting - separation of warheads from
delivery vehicles: Silent
REMARKS: Available information very
sketchy.
A Roadmap to Abolition:
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes




c) Time-bound framework: Yes
d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
e) Multilateral verification: Silent but
implicit.
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Yes
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
NPT
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Silent
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Silent
Global Zero: Action Plan
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Yes
b) Comprehensiveness: Yes
c) Time-bound framework: Yes
d) Non-discriminatory application:
Implicit
e) Multilateral verification: Implicit *
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): FMCT
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
NPT
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Strong, but not on the non-
discriminatory aspect
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Silent
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Weakly
REMARKS: *Stresses effective verification
drawing upon bilateral US/Russian
experience.
Abolition 2000: Founding Statement
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Yes
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b) Comprehensiveness: Silent
c) Time-bound framework: Yes
d) Non-discriminatory application: Yes
e) Multilateral verification: Silent but
Implicit
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT +
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Yes
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
implicit
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Yes
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Silent
Pugwash: Goals in its 11th
Quinquennium (2007-2012)
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Implicit
b) Comprehensiveness: Silent
c) Time-bound framework: Silent
d) Non-discriminatory application:
Implicit
e) Multilateral verification: Silent
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
Yes
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): Yes
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Yes
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Silent
e) ‘No-First-Use’/Prohibition of Use (POU)
or threat of use: Yes
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Silent
REMARKS: Weak operationally
El Baradei: 5 steps towards abolishing
nuclear weapons
I. Overall goal of nuclear disarmament
leading to abolition based on: Yes
a) Universality: Yes
b) Comprehensiveness: Implicit
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c) Time-bound framework: Implicit
d) Non-discriminatory application: Silent
e) Multilateral verification: Silent
II. Interim (and collateral) measures to
facilitate the above and for risk reduction
etc:
a) Vertical non-proliferation - qualitative
(comprehensive ban on nuclear testing):
CTBT
b) Vertical non-proliferation - quantitative
(control of production of weapons grade
fissile material): FMCT
c) Horizontal non-proliferation - directly
(deployment in & transfer to non-NWS):
Silent
d) Horizontal non-proliferation – non-
discriminatory multilateral control of
the fuel cycle: Yes
e) ‘No-First-Use’/POU or threat of use:
Silent
f) De-alerting - separation of warheads
from delivery vehicles: Silent
REMARKS: Forthright but not
comprehensive.
